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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of 1987-1989 the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) created a new Regulation D.1 While the basic structure of
this important set of exemptions from securities registration under the
Securities Act of 19332 (the 1933 Act) remains essentially unchanged, the
combined force of numerous revisions of existing rules and the introduc-
tion of the novel "substantial compliance" concept 3 has shaped a dis-
tinctly different legal environment for exempt transactions. We now
need a guide to that unsettled environment, one that explains the points
1. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1989).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988). For explanation of the operation of the registration and
exemption provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, see infra text accompanying notes 10-20.
3. For discussion of the "substantial compliance" concept of 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (1989), see
infra text accompanying notes 257-82.
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THE NEW REGULATION D
of departure, the changes of direction and the still uncharted territory.
This Article will try to provide such a guide.
The urgency of the need for a guide to the changes in Regulation D
should not be underestimated; any major changes in a set of rules as
important as Regulation D will have great practical consequences.4 The
importance of these rules is manifest in their history. The SEC promul-
gated Regulation D in 1982 as part of a major effort to reduce regulatory
constraints on capital formation-particularly by small business-to the
greatest extent compatible with investor protection. 5 Through that com-
prehensive set of exemptions, the SEC attempted to reduce issuers' com-
pliance costs by simplifying and consolidating disparate exemptive
concepts and devices while liberalizing limits on the size and nature of
exempt transactions.6
This deregulatory effort succeeded. Regulation D became a major
channel for the flow of securities, as issuers large and small raised billions
of dollars through transactions exempt thereunder.7 This "success,"
however, did not end controversy over the Regulation or the federal ex-
emptive scheme as a whole. The securities bar continued to press for
liberalization of the Regulation D exemptions, while critics-principally
state securities administrators---claimed that Regulation D was serving
less as a relief measure for small business than as a conduit for securities
fraud.8 These critics urged that the Regulation be cut back, interpreted
4. For empirical analysis of the use of Regulation D by securities issuers, see Directorate of
Economic and Policy Analysis, Securities and Exchange Commission, An Analysis of Regulation D
(May, 1984) [hereinafter SEC, Analysis].
5. For discussion of the background to the original promulgation of Regulation D, see infra
text accompanying notes 73-113.
6. Id.
7. According to the SEC, the amount of intended sales using Regulation D during the first full
year of its availability (April 15, 1982 through April 14, 1983) amounted to approximately $15.5
billion. SEC, Analysis, supra note 4, table 2, at 14. While there was surely some gap between the
"intended sales" figure, derived from the amounts reported on notice filings with the SEC prior to
the commencement of offerings, and actual sales, the actual sales figures surely can be presumed
substantial. No published data for the years after 1983 is available, but the amount of securities
offered and sold under Regulation D can safely be presumed to be at least comparable.
8. For analysis of the disparate views of the securities bar and the state securities administra-
tors on this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 156-223. The state securities administrators are
charged with administration of the state securities acts, virtually all of which require registration or
exemption of securities offerings made within the state. For detailed discussion of the state adminis-
trators' role in the regulation of securities offerings, see 1 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SECURITIEs
REGULATION 29-152 (1989); Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW.
785 (1986) (report of Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the ABA State Regulation of
Securities Committee) [hereinafter ABA Merit Report].
1990]
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narrowly, or at least not expanded.
These conflicting opinions were evident in the revision process 9 that
led to the development of the new Regulation D. The resulting changes,
however, not only failed to resolve the old controversy, but created new
controversies. Regulation D thus continues to present important ques-
tions of policy as well as practical difficulties and opportunities. Our
guide, therefore, must operate at two levels. It must identify the specific
interpretive and practical problems posed by individual changes to the
rules, but it must also provide a more distant perspective, one that shows
the broad contours of the terrain, revealing the fundamental assumptions
and goals of current regulatory policy. Only this type of multidimen-
sional perspective will make the guide genuinely useful.
This Article will try to provide that comprehensive perspective. Part
II creates a basis for further analysis by briefly describing Regulation D
as it stood prior to the 1987-1989 revisions. This description of the set-
ting for change will provide a working vocabulary of the exemptive con-
cepts used under the Regulation. Part III examines the background to
change by tracing the evolution of Regulation D and showing how con-
flicting attitudes about the need for reform and the appropriate mecha-
nisms of reform shaped the revision process. In particular, Part III
argues that the central dynamic shaping the new Regulation D was a
dialectical conflict between the securities bar and the state securities ad-
ministrators, with the SEC playing a crucial mediating and synthesizing
function. This argument will show the pervasive impact of questions of
federalism on regulatory policy toward exempt transactions. Part IV ex-
plains the basic principles applied in revising the rules and identifies new
interpretive problems. Part V contends that both the recent revisions
and the basic structure of Regulation D make sense as positive attempts
to balance the costs and benefits of securities regulation and to achieve a
rational allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the states and
the SEC. This Article concludes in Part VI by identifying the unfinished
agenda and recommending solutions to those problems left unresolved by
the 1987-1989 revisions to Regulation D.
9. That revision process is discussed in detail infra in the text accompanying notes 156-223.
[Vol. 68:225
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II. THE SETTING FOR CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGINAL
REGULATION D
Section 5"0 of the 1933 Act requires all offers and sales of securities in
interstate commerce either to be registered with the SEC or exempted
from registration. Sections 311 and 412 of the 1933 Act set out numerous
exemptions from registration, some of very broad applicability and
others applicable only to a narrow spectrum of securities or transactions.
Two of the most important exemptions for issuers of securities are sec-
tions 3(b)' 3 and 4(2). 1'
Section 3(b) exempts offerings with an aggregate offering price not in
excess of $5 million made in accordance with rules prescribed by the
SEC.' 5 The SEC has adopted several rules under the section 3(b) limited
offering exemption, including Regulation A,'6 one of the earliest of the
exemptive rules. 17
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
11. Id. § 77c.
12. Id. § 77d.
13. Id. § 77c(b).
14. Id. § 77d(2).
15. Id. § 77c(b). Section 3(b) provides that the SEC may add any class of securities to the
securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that
[registration] with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for
the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character
of the public offering.
Id. As stated in the text, however, the maximum size of offerings that may be exempted by the SEC
under § 3(b) is $5 million. Id.
16. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1989). Regulation A provides an exemption from registration
for offerings with an aggregate offering price not in excess of $1.5 million. Id. § 230.255(a)(1)(A).
While Regulation A is in fact a type of exemption, it requires an issuer to file a detailed Offering
Statement with an SEC regional office. Id. § 230.255. Regulation A thus shares some of the charac-
teristics of registration under § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988). For further discussion of
Regulation A, see Sonsini, Regulation A, 16 REv. SEc. REG. 781 (1983).
17. Regulation A was adopted in 1936. Securities Act Release No. 627-632 (Jan. 21, 1936).
For discussion of the history of Regulation A, see 3 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 1322-
27.
Other important § 3(b) rules include those that immediately preceded the § 3(b) rules adopted in
Regulation D. Those rules were rule 240, 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (rescinded 1982), and rule 242, 17
C.F.R. § 230.242 (rescinded 1982). Rule 240 exempted offerings not in excess of $100,000 within a
twelve-month period, provided that no more than 100 persons held the issuer's securities at the
conclusion of the offering. For discussion of rule 240, see Securities Act Release No. 5560 (Jan. 24,
1975), 40 Fed. Reg. 6484 (1975). Rule 242 exempted offerings not in excess of $2 million within a
six-month period, provided that the offering was sold to no more than 35 purchasers. Rule 242 also
introduced the concept of "accredited investor" that Regulation D inherited. For discussion of the
accredited investor concept under Regulation D, see infra text accompanying notes 284-319. For
discussion of rule 242, see Securities Act Release No. 6180 (Jan. 17, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 6362 (1980).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Section 4(2) exempts issuer transactions not involving any public offer-
ing, without any limit on the aggregate offering price. Unlike section
3(b), section 4(2) does not require SEC rulemaking for implementation of
its "private offering" exemption.18 The SEC, however, has adopted safe
harbor rules implementing section 4(2), including former Rule 146.19
The section 4(2) nonpublic offering and section 3(b) limited offering
exemptions represent separate, concurrent bases for exemption.
Although the exemptive conditions developed under these sections often
have been similar, distinct approaches did evolve as case law and SEC
rulemaking developed.20
The original Regulation D, as adopted in 1982,21 was a set of six rules
18. There is thus a statutory § 4(2) exemption outside of any safe harbor rule adopted by the
SEC to implement § 4(2). An offering that fails to meet all of the many highly specific requirements
of the current § 4(2) safe harbor rule, rule 506 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1989), still
may be exempt under the statutory exemption if it meets the less technical but more amorphous
criteria established under the § 4(2) case law. For discussion of some of this case law, see infra text
accompanying notes 284-93. This is not to suggest that the statutory exemption is more liberal or
easier to establish than the rule 506 safe harbor exemption. Rather, it means that the statutory
exemption may be available in cases in which relatively technical problems such as a failure to file
the appropriate form or to deliver specified information make rule 506 unavailable. The statutory
exemption also may prove useful in transactions involving only small numbers of sophisticated offer-
ees such as institutional investors. For further discussion of the statutory § 4(2) exemption, see
Institutional Private Placements Under the Section 4(2) Exemption of the Securities Act of 1933, 31
Bus. LAW. 515 (1975) (report of ABA Committee on Developments in Business Financing) [herein-
after ABA Institutional Private Placements Report]; Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAW,
485 (1975) (report of ABA Federal Regulation of Securities Committee) [hereinafter ABA Section
4(2) Report].
19. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (rescinded 1982). For discussion of rule 146, see Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974).
20. For example, § 3(b) and § 4(2) exemptive rules both typically have included bans on gen-
eral solicitation of prospective purchasers, limitations on the number of purchasers, and a require-
ment that all offerings that are part of the same issue be integrated for purposes of determining the
availability of the exemption. In contrast, the concept of offeree or purchaser sophistication was
peculiar to § 4(2), while the concepts of issuer disqualification and aggregation were peculiar to
§ 3(b) rules. For explanation of how these different concepts operated in the rules that preceded
Regulation D, see Benton & Gunderson, Venture Capital Financings and Exemptions from Registra-
tion Under the Securities Act of 1933: Section 4(2), Rule 242, and Rule 142, 21 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 23 (1981); Carney, Exemptions from Securities Registration for Small Issuers: Shifting from
Full Disclosure-Part III: The Small Offering Exemption and Rule 240, 11 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 483 (1976); Thomforde, Relieffor Small Businesses: Two New Exemptions from SEC Registra-
tion, 48 TENN. L. REv. 323 (1981).
21. The SEC first proposed Regulation D in Securities Act Release No. 6339 (Aug. 7, 1981), 46
Fed. Reg. 41,791 (1981). The SEC adopted a substantially revised version in Securities Act Release
No. 6389 (March 8, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982). The following discussion in the text of
Regulation D will use the past tense, but this is not intended to suggest that the provisions of Regu-
lation D discussed therein are merely of historical interest. To the contrary, virtually all of these
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss2/2
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designed for use under both sections 3(b) and 4(2). The Regulation rep-
resented an attempt to harmonize the inconsistencies that had developed
among the various section 3(b) and 4(2) exemptions. 22 The SEC's solu-
tion was to define separate exemptions with distinct statutory bases,
while providing a common set of definitions and conditions.
Three separate exemptions were set out in rules 504,23 50524 and 506.25
Rules 504 and 505 were limited offering exemptions under section 3(b);
rule 506 was a safe harbor rule under section 4(2). Rule 50126 contained
definitions common to all three exemptions and rule 50227 established
conditions necessary to varying degrees for all three. Rule 50321 imposed
a notice fling requirement for all Regulation D transactions, requiring an
initial filing on Form D29 soon after the commencement of the offering,
periodic filings during the offering and a final filing after termination of
the offering. 0
provisions are still largely in effect, and the Regulation's basic structure is still largely as described in
this Part II, despite the many changes made from 1987 through 1989. The past tense simply em-
phasizes that there are many important differences between the Regulation originally promulgated in
1982 and the "new" Regulation D. Those differences will be described at length in Part IV. See
infra text accompanying notes 224-360. In order to distinguish Regulation D as originally promul-
gated in 1982 from the current version of the Regulation, citations to the original version will be to
the text published in Securities Act Release No. 6389, supra, in 1982. Citations to the current ver-
sion will be to 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.508 (1989).
22. For the SEC's statement of this purpose in connection with Regulation D, see Securities
Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,252. See also Warren, A Review of Regulation D: The
Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U.L.
REv. 355, 358-59 (1984). The SEC's other goal was to use Regulation D to improve coordination
between federal and state exemptions. 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,252-53. As explained below, that goal was
more difficult to achieve. See infra text accompanying notes 114-54.
23. Rule 504, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. For discussion of
amendments to rule 504, see infra text accompanying notes 321-32.
24. Rule 505, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. For discussion of
amendments affecting rule 505, see infra text accompanying notes 231-319.
25. Rule 506, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. For discussion of
amendments affecting rule 506, see infra text accompanying notes 231-319.
26. Rule 501, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262. For discussion of
amendments to rule 501, see infra text accompanying notes 283-319.
27. Rule 502, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264-65. For discussion of
amendments to rule 502, see infra text accompanying notes 239-56, 353-60.
28. Rule 503, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265. For discussion of
amendments affecting rule 503, see infra text accompanying notes 231-38.
29. Form D, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. For discussion of revi-
sions of Form D, see infra text accompanying notes 142-54.
30. Rule 503, as originally promulgated, required the issuer to file Form D no later than 15
days after the first sale of securities under any of the Regulation D exemptions, every six months
after the first sale, and no later than 30 days after the last sale in the offering. Rule 503(a)-(b),
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Rule 504 established an exemption for offerings not in excess of
$500,000, 31 provided the issuer was not a company reporting under the
Securities Exchange Act of 193432 (the 1934 Act) or an investment com-
pany,33 and that the issuer met certain specified conditions.3 4 Those con-
ditions included compliance with the rule 503 filing requirements, the
rule 502(c) 35 prohibitions on general solicitation and public advertising,
and the rule 502(d) 36 restrictions on resale. Rule 504 did not require any
specific disclosure as a condition of the exemption 37 and did not limit the
number of investors permitted to purchase securities offered under the
exemption.38 The rule also did not require investors to possess any par-
ticular status or suitability to qualify as rule 504 purchasers.3 9
Issuers willing to register a rule 504 offering in every state in which it
was offered, furthermore, were relieved of the manner of sale limitations
and the resale restrictions, leaving them subject only to the filing require-
ment and the $500,000 aggregate offering price ceiling.40
In contrast to rule 504, rule 505 was intended to permit much larger
Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265. For discussion of SEC's later elimination
of the periodic and final filing requirements, see infra text accompanying notes 142-54.
31. Rule 504(b)(2)(i), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. For discussion
of amendments changing the amount of securities that can be sold under rule 504, see infra text
accompanying notes 321-32.
The actual amount of securities permitted to be sold under rule 504 was limited by the principle of
"aggregation." Rule 504(b)(2)(i), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. This
principle required inclusion within the aggregate offering price of any rule 504 offering of the aggre-
gate offering price of all securities sold within 12 months before and during the rule 504 offering, if
sold in reliance on any exemption under § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1988) or in violation of § 5(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1988).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988). The reporting requirements are contained in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m, 78o(d) (1988).
33. Rule 504(a), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
34. For more detailed discussion of rule 504 as originally adopted, see Parnall, Kohl & Huff,
Private and Limited Offerings After a Decade of Experimentation: The Evolution of Regulation D, 12
N.M.L. REv. 633, 673-84 (1982); Warren, supra note 22, at 361-67; Note, Regulation D: Coherent
Exemptions for Small Businesses Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 121,
139 (1982).
35. Rule 502(c), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265. For discussion and
critique of this prohibition, see infra text accompanying notes 412-21.
36. Rule 502(d), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265. For discussion of
these restrictions and changes therein, see infra text accompanying notes 246-56.
37. Warren, supra note 22, at 363.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 365.
40. Rule 504(b)(l)-(2), Securities Act Release No. 6389,47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. For discussion
of amendments relating to the effect of state registration on rule 504 offerings, see infra text accom-
panying notes 321:32.
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offerings;41 its limit on the aggregate offering price was $5 million.42
Rule 505 also imposed, however, a far greater set of conditions and re-
strictions than rule 504. In addition to complying with the filing, manner
of sale and resale requirements also applicable to rule 504, issuers relying
upon rule 505 had to take into account the number and nature of the
purchasers and provide, under some circumstances, specified types of dis-
closure. Rule 505 expressly limited the number of purchasers to thirty-
five4 ' and required delivery of a disclosure document' containing much
of the same information that a 1933 Act prospectus would require.45
Rule 501(e) provided significant relief from the rule 505 purchaser lim-
itation, however, by allowing issuers to exclude "accredited investors"46
from the thirty-five purchaser total-the so-called "body count."'47 This
exclusion allowed issuers to sell to an unlimited number of accredited
investors under rule 505 as well as thirty-five non-accredited investors,
although the ban on general solicitation at least theoretically placed a de
facto outer limit on the number of purchasers.
The accredited investor concept also played an important role with
respect to the issuer's disclosure obligations under rule 505. If the issuer
sold exclusively to accredited investors, no specific disclosure was re-
41. For discussion of rule 505 as originally promulgated, see Parnall, Kohl & Huff, supra note
34, at 673-84; Warren, supra note 22, at 367-74; Note, supra note 34, at 143-45.
42. Rule 505(b)(2)(i), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. As under rule
504, determination of the aggregate offering price under rule 505 required application of the aggrega-
tion principle. Id.
43. Rule 505(b)(2)(ii), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
44. Rule 505(b)(1), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. For discussion of
amendments affecting the disclosure obligations under rule 505, see infra text accompanying notes
353-60.
45. The disclosures required in connection with rule 505 offerings were specified in rule 502(b),
Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264-65.
46. The term "accredited investor" was defined in rule 501(a), Securities Act Release No. 6389,
47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262-63, by means of a list of specifically defined institutional and individual
investors. For discussion of the theory and function of the accredited investor concept, see infra text
accompanying notes 283-302. For discussion of amendments to the accredited investor definition of
Rule 501(a), see infra text accompanying notes 305-19.
For discussion of the role of the accredited investor concept under § 2(15), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15)
(1988), and § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1988), of the 1933 Act, see Warren, supra note 22, at 356 n.8,
368 n.84.
47. Rule 501(e)(1)(iv), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,263. Also excluded
from the body count were relatives of the purchaser who have the same principal residence as the
purchaser; trusts or estates in which the purchaser, or relatives living with the purchaser, collectively
own 50% of the beneficial interest; and corporations or other organizations in which the purchaser,
or relatives living with the purchaser, collectively own 50% of the equity. Rule 501(e)(1)(i-iii), Se-
curities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,263.
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quired as a condition of the exemption.48 The issuer might decide to
produce a disclosure document anyway, as protection against antifraud
liability, but that document did not have to comply with the many highly
specific disclosure requirements of rule 502(b).4 9 If the issuer sold to a
single non-accredited investor, however, a disclosure document contain-
ing the information specified by rule 502(b) had to be delivered prior to
sale not only to the non-accredited investor, but also to each accredited
investor.5°
The accredited investor concept obviously was central to the operation
of rule 505. Rule 501(a),51 which defined the term, did not contain a
generic definition; rather, it provided simply that an accredited investor
meant any person who came within a list of categories of investors, or
any person the issuer reasonably believed to come within those catego-
ries. The rule 501(a) categories included a series of institutional inves-
tors;51 private business development companies;53  tax-exempt
organizations with assets in excess of $5 million;54 the issuer's directors,
officers, partners and similar insiders; 5 entities whose owners were all
accredited investors; 56 purchasers who invested at least $150,000 and met
certain net worth criteria;57 and individuals ("natural persons") who met
specified net worth58 or annual income criteria.59
48. Rule 502(b)(1)(i), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264.
49. Rule 502(b), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264. For discussion of
amendments to rule 502(b), see infra text accompanying notes 239-56.
50. Rule 502(b)(1)(ii), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264. For discussion
of amendments to rule 502(b), see infra text accompanying notes 239-56.
51. Rule 501(a), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262-63. For discussion of
amendments to rule 501(a) and the subsections thereof cited infra in notes 52-59, see infra text
accompanying notes 305-19.
52. Rule 501(a)(l), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262.
53. Rule 501(a)(2), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262.
54. Rule 501(a)(3), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262.
55. Rule 501(a)(4), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262-63.
56. Rule 501(a)(8), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,263.
57. Rule 501(a)(5), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,263. For an investor to
qualify as an accredited investor under this category, the purchase price could not exceed 20% of the
investor's net worth at the time of sale, and had to be paid within 5 years. Id.
58. Rule 501(a)(6), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,263. This category
included natural persons who, either individually or jointly with their spouses, had a net worth at the
time of sale in excess of $I million. Id.
59. Rule 501(a)(7), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg, at 11,263. This category
included natural persons who had individual income exceeding $200,000 per year for the 2 immedi-
ately preceding years and who reasonably expected to have that income during the year of the sale.
Id.
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Rule 505 also differed from rule 504 in that it contained a set of dis-
qualification or "bad boy" provisions, which prevented an issuer from
using rule 505 if the issuer or any of a broad variety of its affiliates had
been subject to specified types of judicial or administrative action for mis-
conduct in the securities business.' These disqualifiers were unique to
rule 505.
The final Regulation D exemption, rule 506, differed from rule 505 in
three important respects. First, the SEC adopted it under section 4(2),
not section 3(b). Second, rule 506 imposed no ceiling on the aggregate
offering price. 61 Third, all non-accredited investors in rule 506 transac-
tions were required to be "sophisticated ' 62 or to have a sophisticated
"purchaser representative. ' 63 Rule 505, in contrast, did not require the
non-accredited investors to meet an individual sophistication standard. 6 4
In other respects, rule 506 was quite similar to rule 505. Rule 506
transactions were subject to the same filing,65 manner of sale66 and re-
striction on resale requirements. 67 The number of purchasers was lim-
ited to thirty-five6 I and delivery of a disclosure document was required,69
but the accredited investor concept mitigated those requirements in ex-
actly the same manner as under rule 505.70
60. Rule 505(b)(2)(iii), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. This subsec-
tion incorporated by reference disqualification provisions contained in Regulation A, rule 252(c), 17
C.F.R. § 230.252(c) (1989). Upon a showing of good cause, the SEC could permit an offering to
proceed under rule 505 despite the applicability of a disqualification. Rule 505(b)(2)(iii)(C), Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
61. Unlike § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1988), which imposes a $5 million ceiling on offerings
that may be exempted thereunder, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988), does not impose a dollar ceiling
on offerings exempted pursuant thereto. Thus, neither rule 506 nor its predecessor, rule 146, 17
C.F.R. § 230.146 (rescinded 1982), contained such a ceiling.
62. Rule 506(b)(2)(ii), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
63. Id. The term "purchaser representative" is defined in rule 501(h), Securities Act Release
No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264.
64. Warren, supra note 22, at 376.
65. Rule 503, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265.
66. Rule 502(c), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265.
67. Rule 502(d), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265. Rule 502(d) imposed
upon issuers in both rule 505 and rule 506 transactions the obligation to exercise reasonable care to
assure that no purchaser is a statutory "underwriter." For explanation of that term, see Warren,
supra note 22, at 365-66 n.63.
68. Rule 506(b)(2)(i), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
69. Rule 502(b), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264. The lack of a dollar
ceiling on the aggregate offering price of rule 506 offerings, however, permitted larger offerings that
might become subject to more detailed disclosure requirements under rule 506(b)(2)(ii), Securities
Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
70. See supra notes 47-50.
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Taken together, rules 504, 505 and 506 provided a comprehensive set
of exemptions. These three exemptions, furthermore, were in no sense
exclusive. If the offering complied with more than one exemption it
could claim more than one exemption.7' In addition, an issuer could
structure an offering to comply with non-Regulation D exemptions such
as rule 14772 or the statutory section 4(2) exemption as well as with one
or more of the three Regulation D exemptions.
That, in brief, was the basic structure of Regulation D as originally
adopted in 1982 and as it stood prior to the 1987-1989 revisions. Those
revisions left the basic structure and terminology intact, even though the
changes were both pervasive and substantial. This overview thus pro-
vides some sense of the setting in which the revision process took place.
To fully understand that process, however, it is essential to delve more
deeply into the background to the recent changes, beginning with the
original development of Regulation D, continuing with the ensuing battle
with the state securities administrators, and culminating with an analysis
of the dynamics of regulatory reform.
III. THE BACKGROUND TO CHANGE
A. The Evolution of Regulation D
The recent revisions of Regulation D were yet another manifestation
of the extraordinary fluidity of SEC policy toward the exemptions from
1933 Act registration. The SEC has been in an almost constant state of
experimentation in this area.7 3 The 1987-1989 revisions followed the
promulgation of Regulation D in 1982,71 which succeeded the SEC's ex-
periments with rules 24071 and 24276 in 1975 and 1980, respectively.
Those rules were themselves sequels to the first major round of experi-
71. See rules 501-506, Securities Act Release No. 6389,47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262 preliminary note
3 ("Attempted compliance with any rule in Regulation D does not act as an exclusive election; the
issuer can also claim the availability of any other applicable exemption.").
72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1989). Rule 147 is a safe harbor rule under § 3(a)(l ) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(ll) (1982), which exempts intrastate offerings. For discussion of rule 147,
see Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 2353 (1974).
73. For discussion of the SEC's experimentation with its exemptive rules in the 1970s and early
1980s, see Sargent, State Limited and Private Offering Exemptions: The Maryland Experience in a
National Perspective, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 496, 505-11 (1984); Seligman, The Historical Needfor a
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 57-61 (1983).
74. See supra note 21.
75. See supra note 17.
76. See supra note 17.
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ments in the early 1970s with the 140 series-rules 144,77 14678 and
147.19 This state of experimentation reflected the transition from the ac-
tivist, regulatory-minded SEC of the 1970s8° to the more deregulatory
SEC of the 1980s. 1
The SEC's adoption of Regulation D in 1982 was not an aberrant act
fostered in a sudden deregulatory frenzy, but rather a culmination-al-
beit an accelerated one-of a preexisting trend toward more workable
exemptive rules. This trend, furthermore, was not the result of some new
failure of nerve on the part of the SEC. It was actually part of an ongo-
ing process of reevaluation that began in the 1960s with radically revi-
sionist attacks by the economists Stigler,82 Benston,83 and Manne84 and
developed into the 1969 Wheat Report's8" much more moderate but still
critical reappraisal of the federal mandatory disclosure system. This pro-
cess of reevaluation persisted into the next decade.86 In 1977, the Advi-
sory Committee on Corporate Disclosure 7 urged the agency to
77. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1989). Rule 144 provides a safe harbor under § 4(1) of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1988), which exempts offers and sales by persons other than issuers, underwrit-
ers or dealers. Rule 144 is actually a definitional rule that defines when persons reselling securities
will be deemed not to be underwriters. For discussion of rule 144, see Securities Act Release No.
5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 591 (1972); 3 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 1502-75;
Steinberg & Kempler, The Application and Effectiveness of SEC Rule 144, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 473
(1988).
78. See supra note 19.
79. See supra note 72.
80. For discussion (albeit critical) of the SEC of the 1970s, see R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY
PROSECUTION (1982).
81. For discussion (albeit critical) of the SEC of the 1980s, see Seligman, supra note 73, at 57-
61.
82. See Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964), revised and
reprinted in G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 78 (1975) (ques-
tioning the need for the SEC's mandatory disclosure system).
83. See Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 AccT. REV.
515 (1969) (critically analyzing those requirements); Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An
Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132 (1973) (criticizing the
SEC's mandatory disclosure system).
84. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (criticizing prohibi-
tion on insider trading).
85. The Wheat Report was an internal study by the SEC of its mandatory disclosure system.
SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE
'33 AND '34 AcTs (1969).
86. Among the most prominent critics during the 1970s of SEC mandatory disclosure policy
was Homer Kripke. See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND SECURITIES DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979); Kripke, The SEC the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities,
45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151 (1970).
87. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RE-
Washington University Open Scholarship
238 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 68:225
reexamine its approach to the special problems of small business, propel-
ling the SEC into further liberalization of its exemptive regime and aban-
donment of many of its lingering doubts over expansion of the
exemptions for limited and private offerings.88
The SEC was given an additional push in the early 1980s by Congress'
enactment of the Small Business Issuers' Simplification Act of 198089 and
the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 198090 and by the der-
egulatory force of the new Reagan administration. The net result was
Regulation D.
Regulation D emerged in 1982 as but the latest of several attempts to
balance the SEC's traditional concern for investor protection with a per-
ceived need to remove unnecessary restraints on capital formation, par-
ticularly by small business. The SEC of the 1980s obviously was willing
to go much farther in this direction than the SEC of the 1970s, whose
PORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]. For
discussion of the public hearings held in connection with preparation of this report, see Securities
Act Release No. 6180, 45 Fed. Reg. at 6363. For discussion of the report, see J. SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION 565-68 (1982).
88. Subsequent to publication of the ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 87, the SEC
made four principal changes. First, it raised the ceiling on Regulation A offerings from $500,000 to
$1.5 million. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1989); Securities Act Release No. 5977 (Sept. 11, 1978), 43
Fed. Reg. 41,383 (1978). Second, it amended Regulation A to permit the use of a preliminary offer-
ing circular prior to the commencement of the offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.256(h) (1989). Third, it
adopted Form S-18. 17 C.F.R. § 239.28 (1989). Form S-18 was a simplified registration statement
for certain offerings with an aggregate offering price not in excess of $5 million. See Securities Act
Release No. 6049 (Apr. 3, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1979). In 1983, the SEC raised the ceiling on
the aggregate offering price to $7.5 million. Securities Act Release No. 6489 (Sept. 23, 1983), 48
Fed. Reg. 45,386 (1983). Fourth, the SEC adopted rule 242. See supra note 17.
89. Small Business Issuers' Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96477, 94 Stat. 2294 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1988)). This Act added a new exemption under § 4(6) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77d(6), for offers and sales solely to accredited investors. It also added a definition of
"accredited investor" to the 1933 Act in a new § 2(15), 15 U.S.C. § 77a(15) (1988). Section 2(15) is
supplemented by rule 215, 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1989), which defines "accredited investor" in the
same manner as Regulation D, rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1989).
90. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96477, 94 Stat. 2292 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1988)). The most significant contribution of this
act was the addition of § 19(c) to the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (1988). This provision stated the
policy "that there should be greater Federal and State cooperation in securities matters," 15 U.S.C.
§ 77s(c)(2) (1988), and directed the SEC to work with representatives of the states to that end. 15
U.S.C. § 77s(c)(1) (1988). Section 19(c)(3)(C) emphasized, furthermore, that the SEC should work
with the state securities administrators to reduce the compliance burden upon small business issuers
subject to state and federal exemptive requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1988).
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approach to the 1933 Act exemptions was always somewhat grudging,9 1
but the long-term trend was basically consistent. What happened in 1982
was the result of a convergence of a preexisting trend with a new empha-
sis on removal of regulatory restraints.92 Regulation D thus absorbed the
prior experiments of the past decade, preserving many of the exemptive
concepts developed in rules 146, 240 and 242 and expanding some of
them to new dimensions.
The basic structure of Regulation D represented an attempt to make
the exemptive system more workable. As explained in Part II,93 Regula-
tion D as originally promulgated consisted of three separate exemptions
joined by a set of common definitions and conditions. This structure
merged into a common pool the separate streams of exemptive concepts
and devices that had been developing independently under sections 3(b)
and 4(2). The SEC intended this new approach to reduce the costs asso-
ciated with an unsystematic, jerry-built exemptive system.94 While the
attempt to accommodate both section 3(b) and section 4(2) exemptive
concepts produced some new anomalies and ambiguities, the overall
structure of Regulation D in and of itself brought some measure of relief
to securities issuers.
The SEC also intended the substantive provisions of the Regulation to
relieve issuers of substantial costs.95 The accredited investor concept, for
example, was an attempt to define in objective terms categories of inves-
tors able to fend for themselves without the protection of registration.
91. A perception of the SEC's attitude as "grudging" is reflected in the intense criticism of rule
146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (rescinded 1982). Some regarded this rule as creating more problems than
it solved. See, eg., Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical
Foreclosurefrom the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139; Coles, Has Securities Law Regulation in
the Private Capital Market Become a Deterrent to Capital Growth?: A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L.
REV. 395, 463 (1975); Note, SEC Rules 144 and 146: Private Placementsfor the Few, 59 VA. L.
REV. 886, 921-22 (1973); Note, Revising the Private Placement Exemption, 82 YALE L.J. 1512, 1519
(1973). Another SEC experiment of the 1970s, rule 240, 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (rescinded 1982) was
criticized for being of little practical use because only offerings of no more than $100,000 could be
exempted thereunder. See Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,800.
92. The new emphasis obviously had much to do with the change of presidential administra-
tions in 1980. For a critique of the SEC during the early Reagan years, see Seligman, supra note 73,
at 57-61.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 21-30.
94. See Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,795; Securities Act Release No.
6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,252.
95. See Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,792; Securities Act Release No.
6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,251-52. The 1977 Advisory Committee Report had made particular note of
the disproportionately high cost of securities law compliance for small business issuers. For further
discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 370-71.
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Use of this concept allowed a substantial expansion of the number of
investors who could participate in limited and private offerings,9 6 and
reduced the risk of liability.97 The objective character of the rule 501(a)
"accredited investor" definition, furthermore, helped reduce uncertainty
costs. Similarly, the very broad exemption under rule 504 for transac-
tions with an aggregate offering price not in excess of $500,00098 repre-
sented a virtually total deferral to state regulation with respect to
offerings too small to justify detailed federal regulation.99 Rule 504 thus
created a flexible means of raising capital by small business. Other sub-
stantive aspects of these rules, such as the $5 million cap on the aggregate
offering price under rule 5051° and the abandonment in rule 506 of of-
feree suitability requirements,10 1 had similarly positive effects on the use-
fulness of the exemptions from registration.
The securities bar largely welcomed Regulation D when it was initially
adopted.I°2 As experience with the rules unfolded, however, some critics
expressed unhappiness with certain aspects of the rules, such as the rela-
tively heavy rule 502(b) disclosure requirements 10 3 and the Form D no-
96. Theoretically, an infinite number of accredited investors could be included in an offering
under Regulation D, but both the ban on general solicitation and public advertising (see infra notes
411-20) and the need to establish the accredited or non-accredited status of each individual investor
put some practical limits on the potential number of investors in the transaction. Nevertheless,
transactions involving dozens of accredited investors are not uncommon. Unfortunately, no system-
atic empirical data on the numbers and kinds of investors in Regulation D offerings is available.
97. Regulation D reduced the risk of liability by: (1) eliminating the need to qualify all pur-
chasers as sophisticated in offerings under § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988), and (2) building great
flexibility into limitations on the number of purchasers.
98. Rule 504(b)(2), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266. For discussion of
amendments to rule 504(a) affecting the aggregate offering price, see infra text accompanying notes
321-32.
99. See Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,793 for discussion of the principle
of deferral to state regulation in connection with rule 504 offerings.
100. Rule 505(b)(2), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
101. Cf former rule 146(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(1) (rescinded 1982), which required that
the issuer reasonably believe, prior to any offer, that each offeree possessed the sophistication needed
to evaluate the merits of the prospective investment, or could bear the economic risk of the invest-
ment. This requirement of establishing the subjective suitability of each offeree, and not just each
purchaser, was one of the most heavily criticized aspects of rule 146. See, e.g., Warren, supra note
22, at 376 n.158.
102. See, eg., Newman & Goldenberg, Venture Capital Formation Under the SEC's New Regula-
tion D, Nat'l L.J., July 5, 1982, at 16, col. I (Regulation D a substantial change in regulation of
capital formation); Sachs & Attman, Raising Capital for Small Businesses by the Private Sale of
Securities-The New Federal and Maryland Rules, MD. B.J., June 1982, at 4, 8 ("the SEC seems to
have balanced adequately the practical flexibility needed by issuers ... with sufficient protections").
103. See, e.g., Schneider, Regulation D-Evaluation and Critique, 15 REv. SEc. REa. 983, 984-
85 (1982) ("the disclosure requirements of Regulation D were excessive"); Note, Regulation D: Co-
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tice filing requirement." Some also continued to complain about
problems that antedated Regulation D but were perpetuated and to some
extent exacerbated by these new rules.
Regulation D preserved, for example, the elusive notion that appar-
ently discrete offerings, or even offerings by apparently discrete issuers,
might be "integrated" or considered part of the same issue for purposes
of determining the availability of an exemption.105 As Regulation D
came to facilitate larger and more complex exempt offerings, some critics
perceived the slipperiness and unpredictability of the integration analysis
to be more of a problem."° Regulation D also continued the ban on
"general solicitation" of potential purchasers contained in earlier exemp-
tive rules,'0 7 thus keeping alive the difficult problem of defining that
term.'0 8 In fact, Regulation D inadvertently complicated matters when
its accredited investor concept allowed exempt offerings to be sold to a
much larger number of investors than permitted under earlier rules,
thereby increasing the risk that a general solicitation might be found to
exist.
Critics also complained of the precarious nature of Regulation D com-
herent Exemptionsfor Small Businesses Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV.
121, 163 (1982) ("[t]he new requirements for audited financial statements... could work an undue
hardship on certain small issuers").
104. See, eg., Donahue, New Exemptions From the Registration Requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933: Regulation D, 10 SEc. REG. L.J. 235, 239 (1982) (criticizing required disclosure in
Form D of confidential financial information); Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All the Dead Wood Out
of its Disclosure System?, 38 Bus. LAW. 833, 851 (1983) ("It]he notice requirement of rule 503
should be abolished").
105. Rule 502(a) expressly incorporated the "integration" concept into Regulation D. Securities
Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264. For more detailed discussion of this concept, see
infra text accompanying notes 398-410.
106. See, eg., Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under Regulation D: Those
Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 Ky. L.J. 127, 162-70 (1985-86) (the integration concept
should be eradicated); Kripke, supra note 104, at 839-43 (present integration rules should be abol-
ished and the concept sharply restricted).
107. Rule 502(c) expressly incorporated the "general solicitation" concept into Regulation D.
Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265. That rule expressly prohibited "any form
of general solicitation or general advertising," except as provided in rule 504(b)(1), Securities Act
Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264. Rule 504(b)(1) permitted general solicitation or general
advertising under narrowly specified circumstances. For discussion and critique of the "general so-
licitation" concept, see infra text accompanying note 329.
108. For critical analysis of the prohibition on general solicitation and general advertising, see
Campbell, supra note 106, at 136-43 (criticizing SEC position); Cohn, Securities Marketsfor Small
Issuers: The Barrier of Federal Solicitation and Advertising Prohibitions, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1986)
(urging reexamination of the prohibition); Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38
EMORY L.J. 67 (1989) (urging abolition of the prohibition).
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pliance. 0 9 Even a modest failure to comply with one of many highly
specific and technical conditions of the exemption could defeat the ex-
emption with respect to every sale to every investor, and subject the is-
suer to devastating liability. °10 The disproportion between fault and
remedy thus shook some of the bloom off the Regulation D rose. Dissat-
isfaction with these problems lingered, and eventually provided much of
the impetus behind the 1987-1989 revisions.111
Despite these problems, the bar largely came to regard Regulation D
as a workable and relatively flexible means of structuring exempt transac-
tions. A far greater level of dissatisfaction, however, simmered among
the state securities administrators. Many administrators still found it dif-
ficult to reconcile themselves to Regulation D,"2 and at least some re-
sented the Commission's insistence upon establishing such a relatively
liberal set of exemptions despite the states' reservations." 3 The states'
reservations about Regulation D turned the principal focus of contro-
versy from federal law to state law, as the crucial issue became how the
states should or should not revise their limited and private offering ex-
emptions to coordinate with Regulation D.
109. See, eg., Donahue, Regulation D: A Primer for the Practitioner, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 495,
520 (1983) (citing risk of liability for failure to comply strictly with the regulation's many complex
and technical requirements); Kripke, supra note 104, at 852 (complaining that too many of the
provisions of the regulation were conditions of exemption); Schneider, supra note 103, at 983 ("Reg-
ulation D overuses the technique of making every requirement ... a condition to the availability of
the exemption.").
110. For discussion of this phenomenon, see infra text accompanying notes 186-89, 224-26.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 185-223 for discussion of these issues in the context of
the revision process.
112. For a typical critique, see Memorandum from NASAA Enforcement Liaison Committee to
NASAA Small Business Finance Committee 3 (Apr. 19, 1983) ("questionable tax shelter deals have
been proliferating .... The encouragement of these offerings through unlimited sales and without
full disclosure is counter to every state securities law concept whether the state has merit or full
disclosure standards.") [hereinafter Enforcement Memorandum] (on file with the Washington Uni-
versity Law Quarterly). One state administrator suggested that "one might anticipate the imminent
emergence of questionable offerings" as a result of the SEC's adoption of Regulation D. Parnall,
Kohl & Huff, supra note 34, at 684 (Kohl was Chief of the New Mexico Securities Bureau); see also
Honig, Massachusetts Securities Regulation: In Search of the Fulcrum, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 469,
490-95 (1984) (describing the difficulties of the Massachusetts Securities Division in accommodating
itself to Regulation D).
Furthermore, some commentators other than state securities administrators expressed their con-
cerns about Regulation D. See, eg., Seligman, supra note 73, at 57 (criticizing SEC for failing to
analyze the potential impact of broader exemptions on investor protection); Warren, supra note 22,
at 381-82 (criticizing the accredited investor concept as creating a "peculiar reduction of investor
protection").
113. See Enforcement Memorandum, supra note 112.
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B. The Battle Over the State Coordinating Exemptions
The debate over the state law consequences of the adoption of Regula-
tion D was but the latest manifestation of a long-standing structural
problem in the relation between federal and state securities laws.1 14 Ex-
emption of a transaction from federal registration under sections 3(b) or
4(2) of the 1933 Act does not exempt the transaction from state registra-
tion requirements. Each state securities act has its own version of section
5 of the 1933 Act, requiring all offers and sales within the state to be
either registered or exempted from registration."' Each state act has its
own set of exemptive requirements, and the issuer must establish a sepa-
rate exemption in every state in which the securities are offered. An is-
suer's ability to sell securities on an exempt basis therefore depends not
just on the practicability of the federal exemptive scheme, but on the
availability of parallel state exemptions. The lack of such an exemption
in one or more states in which an offering must be made will render even
the most liberal federal exemption virtually a dead letter because the is-
suer must structure the transaction to comply with the exemptive re-
quirements, no matter how stingy or idiosyncratic, of every state in
which the offering is made. In extreme cases, the lack of parallel exemp-
tions may require registration of the offering in one or more states, possi-
bly subjecting an offering exempt at the federal level to a stringent state
"merit" review. 16
114. For more detailed discussion of this problem, see Sargent, supra note 73, at 498-505.
115. A majority of states has adopted securities acts modeled on the version of the Uniform
Securities Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the
National Conference) in 1956 and amended in 1958. 1956 UNIF. SECURITIEs ACT, 7B U.L.A. 509
(1958) (amended 1985) (the 1956 Act). For a list ofjurisdictions that have adopted the 1956 Act, see
7B U.L.A. 115 (Supp. 1989). For thorough discussion of the 1956 Act, see L. Loss, COMMENTARY
ON THE UNIFORM SECURrIEs AcT (1976). Section 301 contains the 1956 Act's registration or
exemption requirement. 1956 UNIF. SEcuRITmEs AcT § 301, 7B U.L.A. 550 (1958) (amended 1985).
A substantially revised version of the 1956 Act was approved by the National Conference in 1985
and has been adopted in a few states. 1985 UNIF. SECURITIES AT, 7B U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1989) (the
1985 Act). For a list of jurisdictions that have adopted the 1985 Act, see 7B U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1989).
For discussion of the 1985 Act, which is also referred to as the Revised Uniform Securities Act or
RUSA, see Sargent, Some Thoughts on the Revised Uniform Securities Act, 14 SEc. REG. L.J. 62
(1986); Sargent, RUSA Revisited, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 79 (1989). The 1985 Uniform Act also contains
a § 301 that imposes a registration or exemption requirement. 1985 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 301,
7B U.L.A. 70 (Supp. 1989).
116. State merit regulation has been defined in the following terms:
In essence, merit regulation is a paternalistic system of securities regulation permitting the
administrator to deny effectiveness to a registration statement if the terms of the offering,
the structure of the issuer, or any associated transactions do not (i) ensure a fair relation-
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This structural problem created serious practical difficulties in the
1970s as the SEC began to experiment with its exemptive scheme. The
then-existing state exemptions were based largely on variants of a Uni-
form Securities Act modelI 7 that did not incorporate the private offering
concept of section 4(2) and rule 146.8 These state exemptions also
tended to restrict exempt offerings to very small numbers of purchasers,
to impose narrow limits on the number of offerees, and to apply exemp-
tive conditions alien to federal law, such as prohibitions on remuneration
of salespersons.' 1 9 Some state administrators, furthermore, resisted pres-
sure for compatible changes in state law.120 In addition, there was sub-
stantial state-to-state variation in exemptive requirements, a
phenomenon that exacerbated the difficulties already created by the re-
strictive or peculiar requirements of the individual state exemptions.12'
For much of the 1970s, therefore, the federal and state exemptive sys-
tems were ships passing in the night, largely unresponsive to each other,
and creating great practical problems for issuers with few compensating
benefits to investors.1
22
ship between promoters and public investors, and (ii) provide public investors with a rea-
sonable relation between risk and return.
Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 46 MD. L.
REv. 1027, 1039 (1987). This definition was derived from ABA Merit Report, supra note 8, at 829.
The author of this Article was the principal author of that report, and hence of the definition con-
tained therein. Id. at 785. For discussion of the difficulties of producing a consensus definition of
merit regulation, see id. at 795.
117. 1956 UNai. SECURITIES AcT § 402(b)(9), 7B U.L.A. 509, 601-02 (1958) (amended 1985).
This provision exempts offers and sales of securities to a specified, limited number of investors,
exclusive of institutional investors, in a twelve-month period, if the issuer reasonably believes that all
purchasers are purchasing for investment, and if no remuneration is paid directly or indirectly for
soliciting a prospective buyer.
118. Some states, however, did make an attempt to accommodate themselves to rule 146. For
discussion of Maryland's attempt, see Sargent, supra note 73, at 516-22; Comment, Maryland Blue
Sky Reform: One State's Experiment with the Private Offering Exemption, 32 MD. L. REV. 273
(1972). For discussion of other state efforts, see Note, State Exemptions from Securities Regulation
Coextensive with SEC Rule 146, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1975).
119. See Sargent, supra note 73, at 501-05.
120. See id. Illinois, for example, created serious practical problems by insisting on a report of
sales in connection with exempt transactions, despite the absence of such a requirement in federal
law. See Fein & Bright, Private Offerings of Securities Under the Illinois Securities Law--judicial
Changes and the Need for Further Amendment, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 307, 315-17 (1982). Massachu-
setts required precommencement merit review of exempt offerings, a concept alien to federal securi-
ties laws. See Honig, supra note 112, at 486-88.
121. See Sargent, supra note 73, at 501-05.
122. For critical accounts of the practical problems created by this state of affairs, see J.
MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 11, 19-30 (1971); Garcia &
Kantor, Dark Clouds in a Blue Sky: An Analysis of the Limited Offering Exemption, 23 U. MIAMI L.
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The SEC and the state administrators attempted to create a more co-
operative spirit during the original development of Regulation D.
Largely as a result of the 1980 congressional mandate to the SEC to co-
operate with the states expressed in section 19(c)(3)(C) of the 1933
Act, 12 3 the SEC made a serious effort to involve the states in its attack on
the problem of regulatory restraints on small business capital formation.
Acting through the North American Securities Administrators Associa-
tion (NASAA),' 24 an organization of state securities administrators, rep-
resentatives of the states participated fully in the Regulation D drafting
process, 125 and used this opportunity to express their reservations about
the expansion of existing exemptions from federal registration.126
The state administrators' influence on the drafting process appeared
most clearly in the version of Regulation D originally proposed by the
SEC in Securities Act Release No. 6339 in 1981.127 This version of the
rules proposed at least two conditions clearly reflecting state influence: a
restriction on remuneration of sales agents 128 and a disqualification pro-
REV. 568 (1969); Royalty & Jones, The Private Placement Exemption and the Blue Sky Laws-
Shoals in the Safe Harbor, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (1976).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1988). For discussion, see supra note 90.
124. The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) is an organization
comprised of securities regulators from 65 jurisdictions located in the United States, Puerto Rico,
Canada and Mexico. NASAA Reports (CCH) 1 (1986). NASAA is not a regulatory entity; all
regulatory authority resides with each of its members. Id. NASAA is of enormous importance,
however, in defining statements of policy and guidelines for use by its members. See Makens, Who
Speaks for the Investor? An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regulation, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 435,
443-47 (1984) (analysis of the impact of NASAA guidelines on the regulation of real estate securities
offerings). NASAA also functions as the "voice" of the state securities regulators by commenting on
proposed federal legislation and rules, filing amicus curiae briefs, and disseminating "investor
alerts." Many of such NASAA documents are published in NASAA Reports (CCH).
125. For discussion of NASAA's role in the drafting process, see Securities Act Release No.
6339, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,793-94; Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,252-53.
126. See Memorandum from E.C. Mackey, Chairman of NASAA Subcommittee on Small Busi-
ness Financing, to NASAA Members (Mar. 11, 1982) [hereinafter Mackey Memorandum] (on file
with the Washington University Law Quarterly). Mackey described how the final version of Regula-
tion D "in large measure adopted the NASAA proposals for change" from the proposed version of
the regulation. Id. Mackey added:
In summary, it is fair to say that while your subcommittee is not totally satisfied with the
final product, we were certainly given the opportunity to influence the outcome and where
our ideas and suggestions were not adopted, the SEC had sound reasons and rationale,
from their perspective, for not doing so.
Id. at 1-2. As mentioned above, however, not all state administrators were so sanguine about Regula-
tion D. See Enforcement Memorandum, supra note 112.
127. Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,791-809.
128. Id. at 41,799.
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vision based on prior violations of state law. 129 Bar groups strongly criti-
cized these proposals, 3 ' and they did not survive the next set of
revisions.13 1 The states' influence on the drafting process, however, can-
not be measured solely in terms of these failed proposals. The state ad-
ministrators' strong, critical voice provided a consistent counterweight to
the forces exerted by the securities bar in favor of even broader expansion
of the federal exemptions.' 32 Although some state administrators may
have felt aggrieved by the SEC's decision to promulgate Regulation D
without their proposed constraints, they should have drawn consolation
from their relative success in helping to forestall the adoption of even
more extreme changes.
Some of the state administrators did not see the result in those terms,
so they carried the battle to their own turf-the individual state exemp-
tions that would have to be coordinated with Regulation D in order for
the federal exemptions to be truly effective. 133 Here the state administra-
tors enjoyed a better bargaining position than they had held in the Regu-
lation D drafting process. The battles lost at the federal level could be
won at the state level, or at least refought on more even terms, because
the state administrators had ultimate control over the shape of their own
states' exemptions. This control was far from complete, because the ad-
129. Id. at 41,801.
130. See ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Comment Letter on Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6339 at 42-49, 54 (SEC File No. S7-891) (Nov. 11, 1981) [hereinafter ABA
Comment Letter on Release No. 6339].
131. See Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,256, 11,258.
132. NASAA's representatives in the drafting process were apparently successful in persuading
the SEC to tighten, rather than loosen, some of the Regulation D requirements. According to the
Mackey Memorandum, supra note 126, which was drafted by the chairman of the NASAA subcom-
mittee that participated in the process, NASAA exerted considerable influence over the formulation
of the accredited investor definition:
Not only did SEC agree with our net worth limitation on the "big ticket" purchaser, but in
fact increased the minimum purchase standard from $100,000 to $150,000. The "net
worth" accredited investor standard was increased from $750,000 to NASAA's proposed
level of $1.0 million and they agreed with NASAA's three year income requirement for the
"large income" accredited investor. In fact, SEC went a step further and increased the
income standard from $100,000 to $200,000.
Mackey Memorandum, supra note 126, at 1.
133. Even those state administrators who were more or less resigned to Regulation D may have
been mollified by the realization that they would indeed have the last word in the form of their state
coordinating exemptions. This sentiment is even expressed in the Mackey Memorandum, which is
otherwise quite positive about Regulation D. See supra note 126. After explaining that the SEC did
not accept all of NASAA's suggestions, the author of the memorandum stated that "[a]ctually, what
has happened is some of the things we would like to have seen dealt with at a federal level will simply
have to be implemented as a state initiative." Mackey Memorandum, supra note 126, at 2.
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ministrators were subject to political pressures from the securities indus-
try and the bars within their own states,13 ' but, as a practical matter,
most administrators had the legal and political authority to carve out
their own approaches to exempt transactions.
The willingness of many administrators to use that authority to estab-
lish coordinating exemptions more consistent with their vision of inves-
tors' needs 135 immediately shifted the focus of attention away from
Regulation D to the question of state coordination. The ensuing debate
was not only of great practical importance but of great interest as a mat-
ter of public policy, because it demonstrated the enormous tension im-
plicit in the joint state-federal system of securities regulation. From the
states' perspective, the SEC's virtually unilateral action in liberalizing its
own exemptive rules subjected the states to enormous pressure to aban-
don their own policies toward exempt transactions. From the SEC's per-
spective, the states' insistence on pursuing their own more restrictive and
idiosyncratic paths was inimical to the cause of state-federal uniformity
in a market context that needed uniformity. From the practitioner's per-
spective, the result was a nightmarish morass of inconsistent or contra-
dictory state requirements superimposed upon the new structure of
federal exemptions.
The fundamental debate over the substantive and philosophical bases
of exemption from registration thus became entangled in disputes over
the relative importance of state-federal uniformity, the degree of defer-
ence that the state administrators and the SEC owed to each other, and
the proper allocation of securities regulatory responsibilities between the
134. For description of the kinds of tensions that can arise at the state level over this and related
issues, see Honig, supra note 112. Battles at the state level over state exemptions coordinating with
Regulation D were often tied to battles over merit regulation, an even more controversial aspect of
state securities law. For descriptions of some of those battles, see Sargent, The Challenge to Merit
Regulation (pts. I & 2), 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 276, 367 (1984-85).
135. For thorough description and analysis of the complex and confusing pattern of exemptions
that states adopted to "coordinate" with Regulation D, but which largely reflected many state ad-
ministrators' insistence on applying additional or inconsistent exemptive conditions, see Maynard,
The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How "Uniform' is "Uniform?"--an Evaluation and Cri-
tique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY L.J. 357 (1987). Other commentators exploring the same territory
include Hainsfurther, Summary of Blue Sky Exemptions Corresponding to Regulation D, 38 Sw. L.J.
989 (1984); Halloran & Linderman, Coordinating State Securities Laws with Regulation D and Fed-
eral Integration Policy: State Limited Offering Exemptions and Integration Standards, in STATE
REGULATION OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 155 (D. Goldwasser & H.
Makens ed. 1983); Sargent, supra note 73, at 522-57.
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state and federal governments. 136 In other words, this battle became an-
other example of the tendency of disputes over substantive questions of
corporate and securities law to transform themselves into questions of
federalism.137
The intertwining of serious substantive questions with these intractable
federalism issues made this debate difficult to resolve. Additional com-
plexity, furthermore, resulted from the need to resolve these problems at
two levels. First, NASAA had to determine whether it should adopt a
uniform exemption that would coordinate substantially with Regulation
D. NASAA and the bar devoted great efforts to the development of a
model Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE), which NASAA
finally adopted in 1983.138 NASAA's adoption of ULOE, however, sim-
ply moved the debate to a different level. Because NASAA uniform pro-
visions and statements of policy do not have the force of law and are not
binding on its individual state members, the state administrators had to
decide whether they should adopt in their own states either the NASAA
ULOE, a more restrictive alternative, or a more liberal alternative. The
debate over these coordinating exemptions thus had a peculiarly indeter-
minate quality. Battles won or lost at the NASAA level could be
refought at the individual state level, where the particular constellation
of political forces within the state would determine the degree of coordi-
nation with ULOE and Regulation D.
The results of these debates can be described either optimistically or
pessimistically, depending on one's perspective. From an optimistic per-
136. For detailed consideration of this issue in the context of state regulation of registered public
offerings, see Sargent, supra note 116, at 1060-70.
137. For a cogent analysis of this phenomenon in other contexts, see Anderson, The Meaning of
Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REv. 813 (1984). Anderson
argues that "issues about the appropriate roles for the courts and for Congress in resolving questions
about the federal-state allocation of power often become confusingly entangled with questions about
the appropriate substantive federal-state balance." Id. at 816.
138. NASAA adopted the present Uniform Limited Offering Exemption on September 21, 1983.
Uniform Limited. Offering Exemption, NASAA Reports (CCH) 6201 (May 1989) (with amend-
ments adopted through April 29, 1989) (hereinafter referred to as ULOE or the ULOE). The ULOE
drafting process, which included the participation of the ABA State Regulation of Securities Com-
mittee, actually began before Regulation D was proposed, and continued throughout the Regulation
D drafting and review process. See ABA State Regulation of Securities Committee, Comment Let-
ter on Proposed ULOE 3 (Oct. 9, 1981) [hereinafter ABA ULOE Letter (1981)]. A pre-Regulation
D predecessor of the current ULOE was adopted by NASAA in 1981 and revised in 1982. It re-
mained in effect until superceded by the present version of ULOE. See Maynard, supra note 135, at
378-79. For discussion of the development of ULOE, see Halloran & Linderman, supra note 135, at
165-74; ABA ULOE Letter (1981), supra at 3-4.
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spective, progress seemed to have been made in the mid-1980s through
NASAA's adoption of ULOE and the eventual adoption by a substantial
number of states of coordinating exemptions consistent with or more lib-
eral than ULOE.'3 9 These developments allowed many Regulation D
transactions to be "blue-skied" with some predictability. From a pessi-
mistic perspective, the situation seemed little improved. The NASAA
ULOE in some respects appeared a begrudging form of coordination.14
Some states, furthermore, refused to adopt ULOE-type exemptions,
while others that did adopt such exemptions superimposed additional
and often inconsistent exemptive conditions, requiring extremely careful
and expensive blue-sky compliance efforts. 141 Whether one regards the
outcome of these debates optimistically or pessimistically, the situation
139. Counting the number of states that have adopted ULOE-type exemptions is no easy matter.
According to NASAA's count in 1984, 13 states had adopted coordinating exemptions less restric-
tive than ULOE, and 16 other states had adopted coordinating exemptions more or less consistent
with ULOE. Periodic ULOE Adoption Update, NASAA Reports (CCH) 6401, at 6202-04 (Sept.
10, 1984). According to Professor Maynard, by 1987 27 states had "implemented" ULOE. May-
nard, supra note 135, at 361 n. 10. This figure includes some of the "less restrictive" states included
within the 1984 NASAA count. Other commentators report, however, that by 1988 only 23 states
had "adopted ULOE in some form." Fein, Makens & Cahalan, ULOE: Comprehending the Confu-
sion, 43 Bus. LAW. 737, 738 (1988). The difficulty here is created by inconsistencies in defining
when a state has implemented or adopted ULOE. Those definitions are inconsistent because many
states have insisted on substantially modifying their version of ULOE, thus making it hard to say
whether they have truly adopted ULOE or not. For comprehensive analysis of this bewildering
array of modifications, see Maynard, supra note 135. It is probably fair to say, however, that about
half of the states have adopted coordinating exemptions recognizable as some form of ULOE.
140. In other words, difficulties at the state level have been created not only by individual state
modification of the ULOE, but by the fact that ULOE itself is not entirely consistent with crucial
aspects of Regulation D, and thus has not truly served as an adequate model for state-federal coordi-
nation. For discussion of the inconsistencies between Regulation D and ULOE, see Maynard, supra
note 135, at 386-89. For analysis of the conceptual and practical consequences of the inconsistencies
between the disqualification provisions of Regulation D and ULOE, see Crespi, The Uniform Lim-
ited Offering Exemption: The Need for Amendment of its Disqualification Provisions, 16 SEc. REG. L.
J. 370 (1989).
141. One group of commentators has painted a dismal picture of the resulting situation:
[M]any states have hesitated to adopt ULOE. Some simply refused to act, while others
adopted only a portion of ULOE. Many purported to adopt ULOE but substantially va-
ried its terms, and very few adopted a truly conforming ULOE. Unfortunately, to some
degree the lack of uniformity arises from the parochial perceptions of state administrators
who in some circumstances view their changes to ULOE solely from the perspective of
offerings conducted only in their own state, not comprehending the chaos produced by the
profligation [sic] of ULOE variations for multistate limited offerings.... [T]o us it appears
incomprehensible that all states should not have acted by this time to adopt ULOE if they
considered both the favorable experience of other NASAA members who have so acted
and the need for national uniformity.
Fein, Makens & Cahalan, supra note 139, at 739.
Washington University Open Scholarship
250 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
demonstrated a fundamental and still-unresolved tension within the reg-
ulatory framework.
NASAA, individual state administrators and the bar were the princi-
pal combatants in the battle over ULOE. The SEC seemed to encourage
a greater degree of state-federal coordination, but remained largely on
the sidelines. The SEC's only amendment of Regulation D prior to the
1987-1989 revisions, however, demonstrated that it really was interested
in developing a more coordinated state-federal exemptive regime for lim-
ited and private offerings.
Late in 1986, the SEC announced in Securities Act Release No.
6663142 the adoption of a set of revisions to Form D.143 Some of these
revisions were intended to reduce the amount of information required by
the Form D notice filing, and had no impact on the state coordination
question.1 The principal change, however, was creation of a uniform
notice form that could be filed with both the SEC and states, ending the
need to file separate forms with the SEC and each of the different
states.145 The SEC also intended the revised Form D to facilitate state
enforcement efforts by requiring disclosure in its appendix of the type
and aggregate offering price of all securities sold in each state.146 In ad-
dition, the revisions added a special state signature page that elicited spe-
cific information about persons subject to either state or federal
disqualifiers and that required issuer consent to certain undertakings and
representations of interest to the states.147
The changes announced in Release No. 6663 established a greater de-
gree of procedural coordination between Regulation D and parallel state
exemptions. The drafting of the revised Form D, furthermore, was a
welcome example of state-federal cooperation,1 48 as NASAA representa-
tives participated in the revision process. 149 The persistence of different
state-federal points of view, however, became manifest in the objections
142. Securities Act Release No. 6663 (Oct. 2, 1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 36,385 (1986).
143. The current version of Form D is published at 17 C.F.R. § 239.500 (1989).'
144. These changes are explained in Securities Act Release No. 6650 (June 5, 1986), 51 Fed.
Reg. 21,378, 21,379 (1986), the release in which the changes to Form D were proposed.
145. Id. at 21,378-79
146. Id. at 21,379.
147. Id.
148. The goal of cooperation was stated clearly in Securities Act Release No. 6650, 51 Fed. Reg.
at 21,378: "The proposal to structure Form D as a uniform federal/state notification form is in-
tended to further encourage states to adopt ULOE."
149. Id.; Securities Act Release No. 6663, 51 Fed. Reg. at 36,386.
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of some individual state administrators to the other key change accom-
plished by Release No. 6663: elimination of the periodic notice filings
required during the course of Regulation D offerings and the final filing
required after the completion of the offering. 5'
In its earlier Securities Act Release No. 6650, in which the SEC origi-
nally had proposed these changes, the agency acknowledged that the
periodic and final filing requirements imposed significant costs on both
issuers and the agency itself, and conceded that these filings could be
eliminated with little disadvantage to investors."' Implicit in this con-
clusion was the SEC's recognition that issuers' risk of losing the entire
exemption because of inadvertent failures to comply with the filing re-
quirements was disproportionate to any harm done to investors by issu-
ers' failures to file. Some state administrators opposed this proposal,
however, arguing that elimination of these requirements would impair
their monitoring capabilities and compromise their enforcement efforts
because it would create pressure upon them to adopt similar changes in
state coordinating rules. 152 The SEC adopted the proposed changes over
these objections, but the theme sounded in the state administrators' com-
ments reappeared in their comments on the SEC's more recent proposals:
the SEC was achieving its goal of removing impediments to capital for-
mation at the expense of the state administrators' enforcement capabil-
ity. 5 For some state administrators, the SEC's various attempts
throughout the 1980s to strike a regulatory balance facilitating small
business capital formation actually struck an imbalance that facilitated
fraud, not capital formation.154
The continuing battle over state-federal coordination thus provided the
backdrop as the SEC turned its attention to the substance of Regulation
D. In 1987, the SEC issued a series of proposals addressing the problems
that had emerged during the five years since the Regulation's
promulgation.
C. Creating the New Regulation D: Dynamics of the Revision Process
The shape of the new Regulation D was determined by a dialectical
conflict between the bar pressing for relief from burdens perceived as
150. See supra note 30.
151. Securities Act Release No. 6650, 51 Fed. Reg. at 21,379-80.
152. Securities Act Release No. 6663, 51 Fed. Reg. at 36,386.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 206-15.
154. Id.
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unjustifiable and state securities administrators committed to limiting the
impact of ULOE and Regulation D on their enforcement efforts. As this
conflict intensified, the SEC assumed the role of mediator, and tried to
produce a synthesis acceptable to both sides. The agency's ability to play
that role, however, was constrained by a tension between the Commis-
sion and the SEC staff over the scope and direction of the 1987-1989
revisions. The complex interplay of these dynamics produced a long pe-
riod of uncertainty, no little acrimony, and, finally, compromise solu-
tions. The exquisite difficulty of balancing these different dynamics,
furthermore, probably contributed to the SEC's decision to leave un-
touched long-standing problems such as the definition of "general solici-
tation" and the exact scope of the "integration" concept. 155 These
dynamics of regulatory reform thus permitted substantial change but, al-
most inevitably, left an unfinished agenda.
As discussed in Part III B, 156 the 1986 revisions to Form D reflected
the kind of balancing act that the SEC would undertake on a larger scale
in 1987-1989. The same balancing technique appears in the major set of
revisions to Regulation D proposed in Securities Act Release No. 6683157
in January 1987.
These proposals, at first glance, seemed largely responsive to the bar's
concerns. The release proposed expanding the definition of "accredited
investor" to cover several gaps left in the original definition, l58 raising
the limit on the aggregate offering price for rule 504 offerings from
$500,000 to $1 million under certain circumstances, 59 and creating a
new exemption separate from Regulation D under proposed rules 701-
702 for certain employee benefit plan offerings. 6 This release also in-
vited comment on the desirability of reducing mandatory disclosure
under Regulation D for issuers engaged in relatively small offerings, con-
ceding that "experience over the past four years suggests that there may
be benefits to providing a reduced level of disclosure for such small offer-
ings." 161 Other aspects of Release No. 6683, however, showed that the
SEC was not entirely in thrall to the bar.
155. For discussion of the continuing need for reexamination of these problems, see infra text
accompanying notes 398-421.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 148-54.
157. Securities Act Release No. 6683 (Jan. 16, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 3015 (1987).
158. Id. at 3017-18.
159. Id. at 3018-19.
160. Id. at 3020-21.
161. Id. at 3019.
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For example, the release invited comment on the question of whether
"a substantial or good faith compliance standard should be instituted for
purposes of Regulation D." '16 2 This standard would have created a de-
fense from liability for violation of Regulation D when the failure to
comply with some provision of the regulation was "inadvertent" and "in
a manner that is immaterial to the offering as a whole."' 63 While it was
remarkable that the SEC had announced its willingness to consider a
concept that had been in the air for almost fifteen years,1" the release
took a completely neutral position with respect to the concept, and did
not state any proposed language. This tentative approach to the issue
surely reflected the SEC staff's reservations about the concept 165 as well
as some trepidation about the state administrators' possible reaction.
An even clearer example of the SEC's sensitivity to concerns other
than those of the bar was the request in Release No. 6683 for comment
on the desirability of applying the disqualifiers contained in rule 505 to
rule 506.166 Rule 505(b)(2)(iii) prohibits the use of the exemption if cer-
tain persons involved in the offering, such as the issuer, its affiliates or the
underwriter, have been subject to legal action for specified types of con-
duct.167 In floating the suggestion that it might extend such disqualifiers
to rule 506, the SEC referred specifically to "[r]epresentatives of the state
securities regulators" who believed that the extension of disqualifiers to
rule 506 was appropriate, because exemptions from registration were
"privileges, rather than rights," and thus could "be withheld for certain
persons and should not be automatically available to persons who have
exhibited a disregard for the law." 168 The release contains no SEC state-
ment for or against the suggested expansion, but it is significant that the
agency was willing to consider broader applicability for a concept whose
practical complications had been one of the most controversial aspects of
the original Regulation D. 169
162. Id. at 3020.
163. Id.
164. The source of the concept was Schneider & Zall, Section 12(1) and the Imperfect Exempt
Transaction: The Proposed I & I Defense, 28 Bus. LAW. 1011 (1973). See also Schneider, supra note
103, at 987-88. Other commentators have urged SEC adoption of a substantial compliance approach
over the years. See, eg., Kripke, supra note 104 at 852-53 (proposing adoption of defense for inad-
vertent and immaterial errors-the "I & I" defense).
165. See infra text accompanying notes 190-93.
166. Securities Act Release No. 6683, 52 Fed. Reg. at 3018-19.
167. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii) (1989).
168. Securities Act Release No. 6683, 52 Fed. Reg. at 3018-19.
169. For criticism of the Regulation D disqualifiers, see ABA Comment Letter on Release No.
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The fate of some of the proposals set out in Release No. 6683 showed
the precariousness of the SEC's balancing act. Even the agency's attempt
to reduce some of the burdens on small business encountered complaints
from the new rules' intended beneficiaries. For example, while the SEC's
attempt to provide substantial relief to smaller companies issuing securi-
ties under employee benefit plans 7° was clearly appreciated, commenta-
tors so thoroughly criticized the details of the agency's proposal on both
technical and substantive grounds'"' that the SEC was forced to rewrite
the initial proposal. In mid-1987, the SEC issued Release No. 6726, pro-
posing a less restrictive set of exemptive conditions for employee benefit
plan offerings under proposed rules 701-703.172 Most notably, the SEC
agreed to eliminate compliance with the rule 702 notice filing require-
ment as a condition of the exemption, and proposed instead that issuers
who violate the filing requirement be prohibited under rule 703 from us-
ing the rule 701 exemption in the future. 173 Even this major concession,
however, did not entirely satisfy the critics,' 74 and nearly another year
would pass before the SEC was able to resolve lingering disputes over the
method of determining the limit on the aggregate offering price of securi-
ties to be offered under rule 701.17' The SEC did not announce the final
adoption of rules 701-703 until April 1988 in Securities Act Release No.
6768.176
Some of the other proposals from Release No. 6683 met a kinder fate.
6339, supra note 130, at 53 ("We most strongly urge the Commission to remove all disqualification
provisions in Rule 505 .... "). For analysis of the difficulties created by incorporation of Regulation
D disqualifiers into ULOE, see Crespi, supra note 140, at 375-85 (urging amendment of ULOE
disqualification provisions).
170. Securities Act Release No. 6683, 52 Fed. Reg. at 3020-21 (proposing Rule 701).
171. See ABA Panel's Comment on Proposed Employee Benefit Plan Exemptions, 19 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 451 (Mar. 27, 1987) (commentators identify numerous problems with proposed rules
701-702).
172. Securities Act Release No. 6726 (July 30, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 29,033 (1987).
173. Id. at 29,034-35.
174. See ABA Members Applaud SEC Proposals on Employee Benefit Plan Exemption, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1494 (Oct. 2, 1987) (commentators express appreciation for revision of the
proposal while reiterating several criticisms).
175. See Securities Act Release No. 6768 (Apr. 14, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 12,918, 12,919 (1988) for
discussion of these disputes.
176. Id. Rules 701-703 are now codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.701-.703(T) (1989). These rules are
not technically part of Regulation D, but the SEC proposed and adopted them in connection with
changes to Regulation D, and they obviously serve the same goal of reducing compliance costs for
small business issuers. They thus deserve consideration in connection with the revisions to Regula-
tion D itself. For more detailed discussion of rules 701-703(T), see infra text accompanying notes
333-51.
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The additions to the list of accredited investors engendered little contro-
versy, and their final adoption was announced in March 1988 in Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6758.117 The same release announced the approval
of amendments to rule 504, including an increase of the aggregate offer-
ing price ceiling from $500,000 to $1 million-so long as the issuer offers
and sells no more than $500,000 of securities without registration under
state securities laws 17 8-and the removal under some circumstances of
the restrictions on general solicitation and resales. 179 A reduction in the
level of mandatory disclosure for rule 505 and 506 offerings not in excess
of $2 million also was approved without any major opposition.'
The SEC also disposed of the suggestion made in Release No. 6683
that it add "bad boy" disqualifiers to rule 506.181 Virtually all commenta-
tors objected to the proposal, and the state administrators did not push
for it,182 probably because they felt that the proposal had little chance of
success, and because many state coordinating exemptions already super-
imposed disqualifiers upon rule 506 offerings.1 3 Release No. 6758 thus
announced that the SEC had abandoned the notion.' 8 4
All was not sweetness and light, however, as demonstrated by the con-
troversy over the proposed employee benefit plan exemption. That con-
troversy, furthermore, was dwarfed by the conflict over the substantial
compliance issue. With respect to this issue, the SEC faced more criti-
cism for what it did not propose in Release No. 6683 than for what it did
propose. While the SEC requested comments on the desirability of a
substantial compliance defense, it did not recommend adoption of the
defense and did not set out any proposed language for an appropriate
amendment of the rules. 18 5 The SEC's apparently neutral position on the
issue made the agency a target for attack.
A comment letter provided by a group of several American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) committees described the lack of a substantial compliance
177. Securities Act Release No. 6758 (Mar. 3, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 7866 (1988).
178. Id. at 7867, 7869.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 7867-69.
181. Securities Act Release No. 6683, 52 Fed. Reg. at 3018-19.
182. See Securities Act Release No. 6758, 53 Fed. Reg. at 7867. ("The commentators were al-
most unanimously opposed to the suggestion. No state commented on this issue.")
183. See Maynard, supra note 135, at 461.
184. Securities Act Release No. 6758, 53 Fed. Reg. at 7867.
185. Securities Act Release No. 6683, 52 Fed. Reg. at 3019-20. See supra text accompanying
notes 162-64.
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defense as a "fundamental defect," and urged SEC adoption of such a
defense under Regulation D. 8 6 A New York State Bar Association com-
mittee took a similar position in another strongly worded letter.18 7 These
representatives of the organized bar thus took an unequivocal position on
what they regarded as the most significant issue raised by Release No.
6683. According to the drafters of the ABA comment letter, "Regula-
tion D simply contains too many detailed conditions, many of which are
not susceptible to objective analysis, for an 'all or none' compliance re-
quirement," 188 and "investors as a whole [do not] benefit from the 'all or
none' approach sufficiently to justify the considerable extra expense and
uncertainty it creates."' 1 9
The SEC's immediate response was to do essentially nothing. The is-
sue languished for over a year until a confrontation at a January 1988
meeting of the Commission exposed the conflict between the SEC staff
and some Commission members over the substantial compliance con-
cept.' 90 Some members of the staff apparently felt that the defense would
broaden the exemption unacceptably, and that unpredictable judicial in-
terpretations of the relatively vague substantial compliance standard
would pose a threat to the SEC's goal of investor protection. 191 Some of
the commissioners were far more sympathetic to the concept, and ex-
pressed impatience with the staff's reluctance to propose a substantial
compliance rule.1 92 After an airing of both views, the Commission di-
rected the staff to draft language for an appropriate rule within sixty
days. 19 3 The proposed substantial compliance defense that resulted from
this directive therefore emerged from a policy struggle within the SEC as
well as from the struggle between the state administrators and the bar.
The key to the final adoption of the defense can be found in the Commis-
186. ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Comment Letter on Securities
Act Release No. 6683 at 4 (SEC File No. S7-1-87) (Mar. 13, 1987) [hereinafter as ABA Comment
Letter on Release No. 6683].
187. See Bar Group Urges Support for Proposed Reg D. Amendments, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 481 (Apr. 3, 1987).
188. ABA Comment Letter on Release No. 6683, supra note 186, at 6.
189. Id. at 5.
190. For a description of this confrontation, see SEC Defers Action on Expanding Reg. D to
Consider Possible Violations Defense, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) 128 (Jan. 29, 1988).
191. Id. at 129.
192. Id. The principal supporter of the substantial compliance concept on the Commission was
apparently Commissioner Edward Fleischman. Id.
193. Id.
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sion's ability to impose upon the law its skeptical vision of the costs and
benefits of Regulation D over the objections of the staff.
The SEC proposed the new substantial compliance concept in March
1988 in Securities Act Release No. 6759.194 This release also suggested
two minor additions to the list of accredited investors,195 but the heart of
the release was the substantial compliance proposal contained in a new
Rule 508196 and a related proposal set out in a new rule 507.197
Release No. 6759's version of proposed rule 508 was short and at least
apparently simple. It stated that
[a] failure to comply with a condition or requirement of ... Regulation D
that is insignificant with respect to the offering as a whole will not result in
the loss of the exemption.., if the issuer can show a good faith and reason-
able attempt to comply with all provisions of the Regulation. 9s
With respect to offers or sales to particular persons, however, the issuer
would have to show that "the failure to comply was insignificant with
respect to that offer or sale, as well as to the offering as a whole."' 199 The
crucial term "insignificant" was defined as "an isolated and minor devia-
tion from [the] requirements." 2" Proposed rule 508 thus presented for
the first time the possibility of avoiding, or at least limiting, liability for
registration violations in cases in which those liabilities were the most
difficult to justify. The proposed language was rife with potential inter-
pretive problems, but it nevertheless represented a conceptual
breakthrough.
Proposed rule 507 also represented a breakthrough, while serving
much of the same purpose as proposed rule 508 through different and
more specific means. One of the major pitfalls under Regulation D was
the issuer's risk of incurring section 12(1)2 °1 liability in connection with
even the most carefully structured Regulation D transaction by failing to
comply with the rule 503 filing requirement. 2  Because the filing re-
194. Securities Act Release No. 6759 (Mar. 3, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 7870 (1988).
195. Id. at 7870-72.
196. Id. at 7871, 7873. Rule 508 is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (1989).
197. Securities Act Release No. 6759, 53 Fed. Reg. at 7871, 7873. Rule 507 is codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.507 (1989).
198. Securities Act Release No. 6759, 53 Fed. Reg. at 7873.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 77L(1) (1988).
202. Liability would result under § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77L(1) (1988), because a failure to comply
with the filing requirement under rule 503, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265,
constituted a failure to comply with one of the conditions of exemption under Regulation D. If the
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quirement was a condition of the exemption, even an inadvertent failure
to file could result in loss of the exemption with respect to the entire
offering.
Over the years, the SEC had grown more sensitive to the imbalance
between wrong and remedy inherent in the potentially devastating conse-
quences of a failure to file a notice form that would never be reviewed by
the SEC. As explained above in Part III B,2 ° 3 this sensitivity was im-
plicit in the SEC's 1986 decision to eliminate the periodic and final re-
porting requirements that created traps for the unwary issuer while
producing few benefits for investors. With proposed rule 507, the SEC
went a major step further.
The SEC proposed maintaining the rule 503 filing requirement, but
eliminating it as a condition of exemption under rules 504, 505 and
506.20 An incentive to comply with the filing requirement would re-
main, however, because proposed rule 507 would disqualify from future
use of Regulation D any issuer found to have violated the rule 503 filing
requirement.20 5 Thus, the net effect of proposed rule 507 would be to
preserve an incentive to comply while reducing the risk of liability for
one of the more trivial violations of Regulation D.
Release No. 6759 thereby placated the critics of SEC exemption policy
both within the bar2" 6 and on the Commission itself. It started an up-
roar, however, among those at the opposite end of the philosophical spec-
trum-the state securities administrators. The state administrators'
reaction to proposed rules 507 and 508 was negative, to say the least.
Some administrators not only objected vehemently to the substance of
the proposed rules, but also insisted that the SEC's decision to adopt
such rules violated the spirit of compromise and cooperation prerequisite
to the administrators' adoption and support of ULOE. The president of
sale of securities failed to qualify for an exemption under Regulation D (or some other exemption)
and was not registered with the SEC, a violation under § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988) would result.
Potential liability under § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77L(l) (1988) would then arise.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 142-54.
204. Securities Act Release No. 6759, 53 Fed. Reg. at 7871.
205. Id.
206. See ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Comment Letter on Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6759 at 2 (SEC file S7-4-88) (June 3, 1988)[hereinafter ABA Comment Letter
on Release No. 6759] ("We strongly support the Commission's effort to address the issue of substan-
tial compliance .... We agree with the elimination of the Form D filing requirement as a condition
of the exemption .... ")
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NASAA made these points clear in that organization's comment letter
on Release No. 6759:
There is a deeply felt concern by some state securities administrators that
by unilaterally proposing significant changes in what is designed as a fed-
eral-state regulatory scheme, the Commission is abandoning its commit-
ment to cooperate with the states for the benefit of small business. Equally
disturbing is the possibility that adoption of these rules will produce such
wide differences in the regulatory schemes that uniformity will come to be
viewed as an unattainable goal. 20 7
These proposals thus brought to the surface the old tensions and resent-
ments that had made the battle over ULOE so intense, and threatened to
destroy the fragile consensus that had emerged around that coordinating
rule.20
8
The administrators' specific substantive objections echoed a theme that
they first had sounded with respect to the earlier changes in the Form D
filing requirements. 2°9 In essence, they regarded proposed rule 508 as a
potential obstacle to their enforcement efforts because this change to fed-
eral law probably would be introduced into their own exemptive rules by
means of ULOE or otherwise. According to the NASAA comment let-
ter, proposed rule 508 would "inevitably complicate enforcement efforts
by introducing such vague and debatable concepts as 'insignificant with
respect to the offering as a whole' and 'good faith and reasonable attempt
to comply' into all but the clearest enforcement cases."'210 The negative
impact of the substantive compliance defense, the NASAA letter added,
would be "aggravated by the fact that, whether by design or otherwise,
the policing of Regulation D offerings has fallen almost entirely to the
states.,21  The letter appended to this line of reasoning the barbed com-
ment that "it may be reasonable for the Commission to expect the states
to bear the lion's share of the enforcement role," but that "this separation
207. NASAA Comment Letter on Securities Act Release No. 6759 (SEC File No. S74-88),
NASAA Reports (CCH) T 9317, at 9271 (May 10, 1988)[hereinafter NASAA Comment Letter on
Release No. 6759]. Representatives of NASAA previously had expressed their opposition to the
substantial compliance concept in an earlier comment letter. NASAA Comment Letter on Securities
Act Release No. 6683 (SEC File No. S7-1-87), NASAA Reports (CCH) 1 9310, at 9245 (Apr. 15,
1987) ("A 'substantial compliance' standard for Reg D filings is not warranted. No party has pro-
duced evidence of any hardship (absent hypotheticals) caused by strict compliance with the provi-
sions of Reg. D or ULOE.")
208. See supra text accompanying notes 114-54.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
210. NASAA Comment Letter on Release No. 6759, supra note 207, at 9269.
211. Id. at 9267.
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of responsibilities may make it somewhat too easy for the Commission to
propose rules which- have the unintended effect of impeding
enforcement. 212
NASAA's response to proposed rule 507 was equally vehement:
"When coupled with the provisions of Rule 508, the elimination of the
form as a condition of the exemption will invite the dishonest and the
unethical to hide behind the shield of Regulation D after their activities
have been discovered." 213 More specifically, the administrators feared
that their ability to take action against registration violations under their
own laws would be seriously compromised by elimination of the enforce-
ment leverage that the issuer's failure to make the requisite filing creates.
One state administrator explained in a comment letter on Release No.
6759 that
the filing requirement is critical to allocation of our thinly-spread enforce-
ment resources: when we begin to receive investor complaints with regard
to an offering, and are able to determine that no filing was made as re-
quired, we can move immediately to issue inquiry letters, and subpoenas if
necessary. Frankly, in our experience, the failure to file a Form D is often a
"proxy" for much more serious violations of federal and state securities
laws.214
The state administrators' opposition to proposed rules 507 and 508 thus
counterbalanced the bar's support, and the SEC once again remained in
the middle.
A suggestion contained within NASAA's comment letter on Release
No. 6759, however, laid the groundwork for the compromise that eventu-
ally emerged from this imbroglio. In that letter, NASAA suggested that
the substantial compliance defense be available to defendants facing suits
brought by private plaintiffs, "but never as to federal and state regula-
tors. '215 Sellers could thus use the substantial compliance defense in pri-
vate litigation with purchasers, but not in enforcement actions.
NASAA's suggested distinction provided a starting point for develop-
ment of a compromise.
The compromise resulted from the formation of a working group con-
sisting of representatives of NASAA, various committees of the ABA
212. Id. at 9271 n.1.
213. Id. at 9269.
214. Ellyn L. Brown, Maryland Securities Commissioner, Comment Letter on Securities Act
Release No. 6759 at 1 (SEC File No. S74-88)(May 12, 1988).
215. NASAA Comment Letter on Release No. 6759, supra note 207, at 9269-70.
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and the SEC staff.2 16 The working group eventually produced a solution
to the substantial compliance problem. The solution had three basic ele-
ments: (1) reformulation of the substantial compliance standard itself;
(2) elimination of the defense with respect to violations of the general
solicitation ban and the aggregate offering price and purchaser limita-
tions; and (3) exclusion of the defense from SEC enforcement actions.217
These elements of the compromise gave the bar much of what it wanted
while assuaging many of NASAA's concerns. The SEC thus was able in
Securities Act Release No. 6812 to repropose rule 508 in accordance with
the working group's recommendations. 21 " This December 1988 release
also reproposed rule 507 without change.219 The compromise solution to
the substantive compliance problem quelled all serious opposition. The
SEC announced the final adoption of rules 507 and 508 in March 1989 in
Securities Act Release No. 6825.220 Perhaps the best indication of the
strength of the political rapprochement over the substantial compliance
defense was the speed with which the bar and NASAA were able to work
out coordinating language with ULOE2 21 and to secure approval of those
216. For discussion of the background to the activities of this working group by a member
thereof, see Schneider, A Substantial Compliance ("I & I") Defense and Other Changes are Added to
SEC Regulation D, 44 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1208-10 (1989). See also Summary of the Recommenda-
tions of a Working Group Comprised of Representatives of NASAA, Committees of the ABA and
the SEC Staff (Oct. 4, 1988) [hereinafter Working Group Summary] (on file with the Washington
University Law Quarterly); Resolution of the North American Securities Administrators Association,
Inc. Regarding Proposed Amendments to Regulation D, NASAA Reports (CCH) 11,121 (Oct. 12,
1988) (expressing support of working group's proposals and recommending parallel changes to the
ULOE).
217. Working Group Summary, supra note 216, at 2.
218. Securities Act Release No. 6812 (Dec. 20, 1988), 54 Fed. Reg. 309, 312, 314 (1989).
219. Id.
220. Securities Act Release No. 6825 (Mar. 14, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 11,369 (1989).
221. See Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Reports (CCH) 6201, at 6103 (May
1989). It must be emphasized, however, that ULOE does not entirely coordinate with the approach
taken by the SEC in rules 507 and 508. There is, in particular, no direct parallel to rule 507 with
respect to state filing requirements. Instead, § 2 of ULOE includes a bracketed reference to § 1.C of
ULOE, which sets out the exemption's filing requirement, and in footnote 6 states that in those
jurisdictions that have adopted Regulation D-type postsale notice requirements, "it would not be
inconsistent with the regulatory objectives of this exemption to include the notice filing requirements
of section 1.C within the substantial compliance provisions of section 2 or to eliminate the filing as a
condition and adopt a rule similar to Rule 230.507." Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, footnote
6, NASAA Reports (CCH) 6201, at 6103, 6105 (May 1989). This approach to the filing problem
reflects not only NASAA's continuing reservations about eliminating the filing requirements as an
absolute condition to the exemption, but the difficulty in accommodating a rule 507 or 508 approach
to state exemptions with a precommencement filing requirement. For discussion of such exemp-
tions, see Maynard, supra note 135, at 395-405. For additional critical discussion, see Keller, The
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changes by the NASAA membership in April 1989.222
The true measure of the compromise's strength, however, will come
not at the NASAA level but in the individual states, as the battle over the
actual extent of coordination of individual state rules with rules 507 and
508 begins.223 The continuing disagreement over the complex relation of
capital formation and investor protection in limited and private offerings
should make this battle almost as intense as the initial battle over ULOE.
It remains to be seen whether the states' ability to impose their own re-
quirements and limitations on exempt transactions will undermine the
impact of rules 507 and 508.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF REFORM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW
REGULATION D
The new Regulation D was shaped by the rivalry between the organ-
ized securities bar and the state securities administrators, with the SEC
(despite its own internal rivalries) mediating between the two and trying
to forge consensus solutions. The resulting changes thus bear the marks
of compromise between the bar's desire for changes that would allow
them to complete Regulation D transactions more easily and the state
administrators' desire to avoid changes in federal law that would dimin-
ish their ability to enforce their own laws. The SEC loosened many ex-
isting constraints on exempt financing in response to arguments from the
bar and its allies on the Commission, but slowed the deregulatory mo-
mentum in response to expressions of concern by state administrators
and their sympathizers on the SEC staff. Despite these necessary com-
promises, however, the revisions will make it easier and less expensive for
issuers to raise capital under Regulation D.
A closer look at the 1987-1989 revisions will show how this result was
achieved. In particular, an analysis of the basic principles by which Reg-
ulation D was reformed will demonstrate the cumulative effect of the
many specific revisions. This analysis also will reveal the new interpre-
tive problems generated by these revisions.
Saga of a Substantial Compliance Defense, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1989, at 11, 15-16. See also infra text
accompanying notes 392-95.
222. See Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Reports (CCH) q 6201, at 6101 (May
1989).
223. For expressions of concern over this issue, see Halloran & Mendelson, Revisions to Regula-
tion D, INSIGHTS, May 1988, at 3, 10; Keller, supra note 221, at 15-16. See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 392-95.
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A. Reduction of the Risk of Liability for Noncompliance
As the bar's comments on the SEC's substantial compliance proposals
made clear,224 reliance on the original version of Regulation D often was
very dangerous. Any careful securities practitioner asked to give a for-
mal opinion on the exempt status of a Regulation D transaction would
have been aware of the precarious nature of the exemption, and would
tend to give a highly conditioned opinion. 25 This sense of danger de-
rived from three basic problems.
First, Regulation D contained many specific requirements, all of which
were considered conditions of the exemption.226 Many of these condi-
tions were highly technical in nature and easily overlooked, such as some
of the specific disclosure requirements and the periodic and final filing
requirements. As a result, the possibility of noncompliance-and hence
loss of the exemption-was relatively high.
Second, Regulation D absorbed the principle established in the case
law under section 4(2)227 that a compliance failure with respect to one
purchaser-for example, a failure to establish that purchaser's accredited
or sophisticated status or to deliver a disclosure document-would result
in loss of the exemption not just for that purchaser but for the entire
offering. Purchasers with no connection to the act or acts of noncompli-
ance thus would obtain the windfall of a right of rescission, and the issuer
would face enormous potential liability.
Third, some of the key exemptive concepts used under Regulation D
224. See ABA Comment Letter on Release No. 6683, supra note 186, at 5:
The exposure to potential rescission requests [in connection with Regulation D offerings] is
magnified by the likelihood that some insubstantial or inadvertent error exists, for Regula-
tion D has not been drafted with objective precision .... We believe uncertainty is affect-
ing decisions regarding methods of financing and is resulting in unnecessary expense.
225. The ABA stated: "Lawyers and accountants who must make professional judgments as to
the adequacy of compliance are bound by the rigidity of Regulation D. Conclusions are often based
on time-consuming and expensive procedures and yet still are qualified as to potential inadvertent
and insubstantial matters." Id. See also Halloran & Mendelsen, supra note 223, at 7:
The lack of a substantial or good faith compliance standard subjects an issuer using Regu-
lation D to the endless uncertainty and fear that a dissatisfied investor will seek to overturn
the entire offering. This uncertainty also affects lawyers, who often must render an opinion
in connection with a private placement.., and accountants, who must account for contin-
gent liabilities.
226. For criticism of this feature of Regulation D, see Kripke, supra note 104, at 852; Schneider,
supra note 103, at 983.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988). See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953);
Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Continental
Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 158-61 (5th Cir. 1972).
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were inherited from the amorphous and inconsistent body of case law
and SEC rulemaking under section 4(2) and proved very difficult to ap-
ply. The most notable examples were the integration,228 general solicita-
tion 229 and sophistication 230 concepts that played various roles under the
different Regulation D exemptions.
The net result of these structural problems was persistent risk of liabil-
ity. Conscientious practitioners could mitigate that risk for their clients,
but the sense of uncertainty remained. As concern over this problem
grew, the SEC revised Regulation D to provide a twofold solution: re-
duction of occasions for noncompliance and application of the concept of
substantial compliance.
1. Reduction of Occasions for Noncompliance
(a) Rule 507
One of the major occasions for noncompliance under Regulation D
was the rule 503 notice filing requirement. In one sense, this filing re-
quirement was quite trivial. The SEC did not review filings on Form D
to ensure compliance with the exemption, and apparently did not use it
widely in connection with enforcement actions. The requirement served
primarily as a means for the SEC to gather data about the use of Regula-
tion D.231 In another sense, however, this requirement was very impor-
tant. It was a condition of the three exemptions, and a failure to file in a
timely manner could result in loss of the exemption for the entire offer-
ing. The risk of liability was exacerbated, as we have seen, by the need to
make not only an initial filing, but also periodic filings during the course
of the offering and a postcompletion final filing.2 32 Even careful attor-
neys all too often overlooked these additional filing requirements.
The SEC's first attempt to mitigate the filing problem came in 1986
with the elimination of the periodic and final filing requirements. 233 The
initial filing requirement, however, remained a condition of the exemp-
tion, leaving much of the problem intact. That requirement was perhaps
the prime example of a relatively unimportant condition whose violation
was both easy and potentially disastrous.
228. See infra text accompanying notes 398-410.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 411-20.
230. See infra text accompanying notes 283-302.
231. Securities Act Release No. 6650, 51 Fed. Reg. at 21,378.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 151-54.
233. Id.
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The SEC addressed the problem by removing the filing requirement as
a condition of the three Regulation D exemptions. 34 That is the net
result of rule 507 and related amendments to the rules, although the na-
ture of the change is more complex than that description might suggest.
Rule 503(a)23 5 still directs an issuer offering or selling securities under
rules 504, 505 or 506 to file Form D no later than fifteen days after the
first sale; rule 507 simply redefines the consequences of failure to make
that filing. No longer will the exemption be lost for the present offering.
Instead, the issuer will be disqualified from using Regulation D in con-
nection with any future offering if a court has enjoined the issuer or any
predecessor or affiliate for violation of the filing requirement.236 This ap-
proach leaves an incentive to comply with rule 503, while mitigating the
immediate consequences of failing to do so. Rule 507(b) 237 carries this
mitigation even further by authorizing the Commission to waive the rule
507(a) disqualification "upon a showing of good cause, '238 thus allowing
some past violators of rule 503 to rely on the Regulation D exemptions
for new offerings. The circumstances under which the Commission will
waive the disqualification remain to be defined.
(b) Rule 502(b)
With respect to the filing requirement, the SEC's strategy for reducing
the risk of liability under Regulation D was elimination of one of the
most easily violated conditions of the exemption. Changes to rule 502(b)
reflect the same strategy. Rule 502(b)(1)(i) previously provided that no
specific information need be furnished as a condition of the rule 505 or
rule 506 exemptions if the issuer intended to sell securities only to ac-
credited investors.239 Rule 502(b)(1)(ii) provided, however, that if the se-
curities were sold to any non-accredited investor the issuer would have to
furnish information specified by the rule to all investors, including the
accredited investors." ° In other words, a requirement of disclosure to all
234. The SEC eliminated the filing as a condition of the exemptions amending rules 504(b),
505(b) and 506(b) to delete references to compliance with the rule 503 Form D filing requirement as
a condition to the exemption. See Securities Act Release No. 6812, 54 Fed. Reg. at 314; Securities
Act Release No. 6825, 54 Fed. Reg. at 11,373.
235. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a) (1989).
236. Id. § 230.507(a).
237. Id. § 230.507(b).
238. Id.
239. Rule 502(b)(I)(i), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264.
240. Rule 502(b)(1)(ii), id. at 11,264.
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investors materialized as soon as one non-accredited investor entered the
transaction. Any failure, inadvertent or otherwise, to deliver the speci-
fied information to even a single accredited investor would jeopardize the
entire exemption.
In addition, rule 502(b)(2)(iv) required that all non-accredited inves-
tors receive "a brief description in writing of any written information
concerning the offering that has been provided by the issuer to any ac-
credited investor." '241 This affirmative disclosure obligation was not lim-
ited to material information, and had to be satisfied prior to purchase.242
Compliance with this requirement proved very tricky, as large, complex
transactions involving many accredited investors inevitably produced
substantial amounts of correspondence and other types of written com-
munication among the parties. It was a real trap for the unwary.
Revised rule 502(b) deals with these two problems very directly. Rule
502(b)(1) no longer requires disclosure to accredited investors whenever
a non-accredited investor purchases part of the offering; the disclosure
obligation runs only to the non-accredited investor or investors.243 As
the SEC explained in proposing this change, "the accredited investors are
in the same position they undoubtedly believed they were in from the
start, i.e., not entitled to any mandated disclosure. ' 21 Issuers may wish
to deliver a disclosure document to accredited investors for protection
from fraud liability, but they no longer will run the risk of liability for a
registration violation because one or more accredited investors fail to re-
ceive a disclosure document.
Revised rule 502(b)(2)(iv) solves the other problem by requiring de-
scription only of material written information delivered to accredited in-
vestors.245 This change makes the requirement more meaningful, and
eliminates a potential source of anxiety for the issuer.
(c) Rule 502(d)
One of the basic principles of Regulation D is that securities purchased
in rule 505 and 506 transactions and in some rule 504 transactions are
restricted securities that a purchaser cannot resell without a separate ex-
emption from registration. In addition to stating this basic principle, rule
241. Rule 502(b)(2)(iv), id. at 11,265.
242. Id.
243. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (1989).
244. Securities Act Release No. 6812, 54 Fed. Reg. at 311.
245. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(iv) (1989).
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502(d)24 6 requires the issuer to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the
purchasers of the securities are not "underwriters" within the meaning of
section 2(11)247 of the 1933 Act. The original version of rule 502(d) also
provided that such "reasonable care shall include, but not be limited to"
three specific steps: inquiry as to investment intent, written disclosure of
the security's restricted status, and legending of the stock certificate or
other document evidencing the security. 4 This language had been read
as requiring that issuers take those specific steps as a condition of the
exemption.249
Revised rule 502(d) dispels this impression by adding the following
disclaimer: "While taking these actions will establish the requisite rea-
sonable care, it is not the exclusive method to demonstrate such care.
Other actions by the issuer may satisfy this provision."25 A failure to
place the appropriate legend on a stock certificate thus will not imperil
the exemption, so long as the issuer can otherwise establish that it took
reasonable care.
A failure to disclose the restricted status of the securities, however,
may produce a problem under other new provisions of the regulation.
Under rule 502(b)(2)(vii), the issuer now must advise all non-accredited
investors in rule 505 or 506 offerings of the restricted nature of the secur-
ities.25' Similarly, rule 504(b)(2)(ii) now requires all investors in rule 504
offerings to receive such advice from the issuer except in specified cir-
cumstances.252 These new requirements-added at the insistence of
NASAA representatives 2 3 -seem to undercut rule 502(d)'s attempt to
diminish, rather than increase, the burden created by the issuer's obliga-
tion to police redistributions. As a practical matter, however, these re-
quirements should not cause much of a problem, at least with respect to
rule 505 or 506 offerings. Non-accredited investors in such offerings
must receive a full-blown disclosure document in any event,254 so this
additional disclosure requirement will not be burdensome. In rule 504
246. Id. § 230.502(d).
247. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1988).
248. Rule 502(d), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,265.
249. See ABA Comment Letter on Release No. 6759, supra note 206, at 3.
250. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1989).
251. Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(vii).
252. Id. § 230.504(b)(2)(ii).
253. Securities Act Release No. 6825, 54 Fed. Reg. at 11,371.
254. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (1989).
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offerings, however, it may create a trap,2 55 because that exemption re-
quires very few affirmative steps by the issuer. The issuer easily may
overlook this relatively minor requirement and therefore face potentially
serious problems.256
2. Substantial Compliance
As suggested in Part III C,257 the most dramatic change to Regulation
D was the addition of a substantial compliance concept in new rule
508.258 The operation of rule 508 requires careful description.
Rule 508 allows an issuer to establish the existence of an exemption
under Regulation D despite a failure to comply with one or more of the
conditions of the exemption. Rule 508(a) provides that a failure to com-
ply with one or more of the exemptions will not result in loss of the
exemption for any offer or sale to a particular individual or entity if the
person relying on the exemption makes three required showings: (1) that
the term, condition or requirement was not "directly intended to protect
that particular individual";259 (2) that the failure to comply was "insig-
nificant with respect to the offering as a whole;"260 and (3) that a "good
faith and reasonable attempt was made to comply" with all of the Regu-
lation's terms, conditions and requirements.261
The net effect of rule 508 is to cut off liability to purchasers who had
255. See Keller, supra note 221, at 13 (explaining how this disclosure requirement might be
overlooked). Apparently the SEC and NASAA are considering some kind of exception from this
disclosure requirement for smaller issuers. See id.; Securities Act Release No. 6825, 54 Fed. Reg, at
11,371 (describing continuing SEC-NASAA review of the problem).
256. One other way in which the new Regulation D has reduced opportunities for noncompli.
ance deserves mention. Keller explains that the revisions to Regulation D overcome
a technical drafting problem by allowing the existence of facts to be an alternative way to
satisfy requirements without regard to whether the issuer had a "reasonable belief" about a
fact. For example, before the revision one could theorize that the exemption would not be
available if the issuer did not have a reasonable belief as to the sophistication and number
of non-accredited investors even if they were sophisticated and limited to 35. Now the
existence of these facts alone will satisfy the requirement.
Keller, supra note 221, at 13. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1989) ("There are no more than or
the issuer reasonably believes that there are no more than 35 purchasers of securities"); id.
§ 230.506(b)(2)(i) (similar language with respect to the number of purchasers). See also id.
§ 230.506(b)(2)(ii), where the alternative between reasonable belief and the actual existence of the
facts is created with respect to the nature of the non-accredited investors.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 185-200.
258. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (1989).
259. Id. § 230.508(a)(1).
260. Id. § 230.508(a)(2).
261. Id. § 230.508(a)(3).
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no connection to the violation, provided that the violation was "insignifi-
cant with respect to the offering as a whole" and a "good faith and rea-
sonable attempt" to comply was made. In other words, rule 508 reduces
the risk of liability for inadvertent violations and denies the right of re-
scission to purchasers who were not directly victimized by the noncom-
pliance. Two examples will show how rule 508 works.
Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) requires all non-accredited investors in rule 506
transactions to be sophisticated or to have a sophisticated purchaser rep-
resentative. 262 Assume that purchasers A-F are accredited investors.
Purchaser G is a non-accredited investor who also turns out not to be
sophisticated, despite the issuer's efforts to establish sophistication on the
part of all the non-accredited investors. Under rule 508, the issuer will
lose the rule 506 exemption with respect to purchaser G. Purchaser G
will have a right of rescission because the sophistication requirement was
"directly intended to protect that particular individual." Purchasers A-
F, however, will not have rights of rescission because the sophistication
requirement is not "directly intended" to protect accredited investors.
This conclusion, however, assumes that the violation is "insignificant
with respect to the offering as a whole," and the issuer made a "good
faith and reasonable attempt" to comply.
Another example will show a similar result. Rule 502(b)(1) requires
delivery of specified information to non-accredited investors in rule 505
and rule 506 transactions.263 Assume that Purchasers A and B are non-
accredited investors in a rule 505 transaction. Purchaser A receives the
information specified by the rule, while purchaser B does not. Purchaser
B has a right of rescission because of the issuer's failure to comply with a
requirement "directly intended" to protect that investor. Purchaser A,
however, cannot rescind on the basis of the non-disclosure to purchaser
B, assuming that the failure to comply was "insignificant with respect to
the offering as a whole," and a "good faith and reasonable attempt" to
comply was made.2M
These examples demonstrate the basic operation of rule 508, but they
also suggest that some important interpretive problems remain. For in-
stance, it is by no means clear when a failure to comply will be deemed
"insignificant with respect to the offering as a whole." Rule 508(a)(1)
262. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
263. Id. § 230.502(b)(1). See supra text accompanying notes 250-55.
264. Accord Keller, supra note 221, at 14 (same conclusion on basis of similar hypothetical).
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states expressly 265 that violations of the rule 502(c) prohibition on gen-
eral solicitation,266 the rule 504267 and rule 505268 limitations on aggre-
gate offering price and the rule 505269 and rule 506270 limitations on the
number of purchasers shall always be deemed to be "significant to the
offering as a whole," but the rule does not similarly categorize other
types of violations2 71 or attempt a generic definition of "significant" or
"insignificant." The relation of these terms to the traditional securities
law concept of materiality remains to be determined, as does the rele-
vance of the number or scale of the acts of non-compliance.
A distinction may evolve between violations that are merely investor-
specific, such as failures to qualify an individual investor as sophisticated
or to deliver a disclosure document to a particular non-accredited inves-
tor, and violations of provisions that seem to touch the offering as a
whole, such as the general solicitation ban and the aggregate offering
price and purchaser limitations. This distinction, however, may not be a
true touchstone. What about disqualifier provisions, for example? When
will the presence of a person subject to disqualification be considered sig-
nificant to the offering as whole? In all cases? Only when the issuer itself
is subject to disqualification? Will the result depend upon who the dis-
qualified person was and what that person's role in the offering might
have been?272 The answers to these questions are not clear.
265. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a)(2) (1989).
266. Id. § 230.502(c).
267. Id. § 230.504(b)(2)(i).
268. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).
269. Id.
270. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
271. One may ask why the SEC decided to carve these particular violations out of the coverage
of rule 508. A prominent member of the working group that drafted the final version of rule 508 (see
supra note 216) explains that
[w]ith respect to the carve-outs, the SEC staff and NASAA believed that the underlying
provisions were so integral to the essence of the statutory exemptions that any I & I-type
defense would be inappropriate without the carve-outs. While the bar representatives ar-
gued vigorously for their elimination, it became clear that the political and practical reali-
ties precluded adoption of any workable compromise without these carve-outs.
Schneider, supra note 216, at 1213.
The practical impact of these carve-outs is debatable. If the SEC continues to take a somewhat
more relaxed approach to the general solicitation prohibition (see infra text accompanying notes 417-
18), the carve-out may not be of great significance. Similarly, the availability of both a reasonable
belief and actual existence standard with respect to the number of purchasers (see supra note 256)
mitigates the impact of the carve-out with respect to violation of the purchaser limitations. Accord
Keller, supra note 221, at 15.
272. It is also not entirely clear when the presence of a disqualified person will be considered a
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Even clearly investor-specific violations, furthermore, may be signifi-
cant with respect to the offering as a whole if the purchaser or purchasers
who gain a right to rescission have purchased a substantial percentage of
the offering. If their right to withdraw their investment will jeopardize
the success of the entire offering or even the ultimate fate of the issuer,
the question of significance may turn on quantitative as well as qualita-
tive factors.2 73 The SEC and the courts presumably will develop much-
needed interpretations of these questions.
Similarly, the elements of a "good faith and reasonable attempt" to
comply with the regulation remain to be defined. The SEC, however,
clearly does not intend to countenance a "close is good enough" attitude
toward Regulation D compliance. The agency's position is implicit in
rule 508(b), which states flatly that a transaction made in reliance on
rules 504, 505 or 506 "shall comply with all applicable terms, conditions
and requirements of Regulation D., 27 4 Strict compliance apparently will
be regarded as the norm, and substantial compliance the exception. Pre-
sumably, the lack of compliance must be somehow "innocent" or "inad-
vertent"-to use the words of earlier formulations of the substantial
compliance concept 2 7 5-because the "good faith" language would seem
to eliminate anyone who intentionally disregards any aspect of the Regu-
lation's requirements.276 Furthermore, there must be some attempt to
comply. A person ignorant of the requirements of the regulations and
who does not even try to comply with them cannot claim substantial
compliance.277
Issuers probably will have to show that they established an appropriate
procedure or mechanism for compliance, and that some carelessness or
slip-up (preferably at a clerical level) caused the violation.2 78 The rule
violation of a term intended to protect a particular investor. Will it be so considered in all cases?
For an argument to the contrary, see Keller, supra note 221, at 14.
273. For arguments to this effect, see Keller, supra note 221, at 15; Schneider, supra note 216, at
1211.
274. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(b) (1989).
275. See supra notes 198-200.
276. Accord Keller, supra note 221, at 15 (a person who does not act in good faith may not claim
substantial compliance).
277. Accord id. (the "attempt to comply" requirement excludes persons ignorant of the rule);
Schneider, supra note 216, at 1211 ("In effect, there can be no such thing as inadvertent substantial
compliance with regulation D by a person unmindful of the requirements.").
278. Accord Schneider, supra note 216, at 1211 ("The prototypical circumstances to which rule
508 should apply is where the issuer has adopted a reasonable plan to assure compliance, and some
accidental or careless oversight occurred.").
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506 issuer with the unexpectedly unsophisticated, non-accredited inves-
tor on its hands, for example, might need to establish that it had devel-
oped an appropriate purchaser questionnaire, that a means of delivering,
gathering and evaluating the questionnaires had been in place, and that
the investor in question somehow had just had been "missed." Similarly,
the rule 505 issuer who failed to deliver the required disclosure document
to a non-accredited investor might have to show that the documents had
been numbered and cross-indexed with the names of the recipients and
the sales personnel, and that a messenger or someone in the back office
had mislaid the copy to be delivered to the investor in question. In any
event, interpretation on a case-by-case basis is needed here as well, but it
is unlikely that the present uncertainty will encourage a more casual ap-
proach to Regulation D compliance, especially in light of the additional
disincentive created by rule 508(b).
Rule 508(b) reflects the basic compromise with the state securities ad-
ministrators.279 It provides28 0 that when an exemption is established
only through reliance on rule 508, the failure to comply shall nonetheless
be actionable by the SEC in an enforcement action under section 20281 of
the 1933 Act. The combined force of this reserved enforcement author-
ity and the "good faith and reasonable attempt" condition should pre-
vent undue reliance on substantial compliance and erosion of the level of
care devoted to Regulation D transactions by securities counsel. The
states also are likely to retain their enforcement powers with respect to
offerings seeking exemption under equivalent state substantial compli-
ance concepts.282 That will provide yet another good reason for contin-
ued adherence to the straight and narrow.
The distinction between private actions in which substantial compli-
ance relief is available and enforcement actions in which it is not may
make sense as a matter of both policy and politics, but it raises the legal
question of whether the SEC has the authority to adopt a rule making
such a distinction. The SEC has, in effect, waved a magic wand turning a
violation of section 5 into a nonviolation for all purposes other than its
own. None of the SEC's releases concerning rule 508 provided any real
discussion of this issue.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 215-22.
280. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(b)o) (1989).
281. 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1988).
282. Indeed, they have under ULOE. See Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Re-
ports (CCH) S 6201, at 6104 (May 1989).
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The problem, however, may be more technical than substantive.
Although rule 508 is part of a set of rules defining conditions for exemp-
tion under sections 3(b) and 4(2), it does not define additional exemptive
conditions; instead it limits the private purchaser's right of action under
section 12(1) for failure to meet certain of those conditions. Technically,
it perhaps should be regarded as a definitional or interpretive rule under
section 12(1), one that the SEC has authority to adopt. Some clarifica-
tion of this issue by the SEC, however, would be helpful.
The novel character of rule 508 thus creates numerous interpretive
problems. It is nevertheless fair to say that the substantial compliance
concept is the most useful attempt to mitigate the difficulties of Regula-
tion D financing yet encountered.
B. Expansion of the Class of Investors Deemed Able to Fend for
Themselves
Among the most important of the 1987-1989 changes to Regulation D
was the expansion of the categories of accredited investors.283 To under-
stand why these changes are important-indeed, to understand why the
base concept of accredited investor is so important-it is necessary to
return to the source of this approach to investor suitability.
In his famous 1953 opinion in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Ralston Purina Co.,284 Justice Clark held that the difference between a
public and private offering under section 4(2) lies in the private offering
being made only to those "able to fend for themselves. '285 Justice Clark
reached this conclusion, eschewing simpler formulations of the pub-
lic/private distinction, through an analysis of the purpose of the registra-
tion provisions of the 1933 Act. Their purpose, according to Justice
Clark, was to protect investors through mandatory disclosure of informa-
tion necessary to investment decisions.286 In contrast, offerings to per-
sons who do not need that protection-that is, persons able to fend for
themselves -should be exempt from registration. The key to a private
offering, therefore, is the nature of the offerees.
Ralston Purina established the basic parameters of section 4(2) analy-
sis. Less subtle means of drawing the line between public and private
283. See infra text accompanying notes 303-19.
284. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
285. Id. at 124-25.
286. Id.
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transactions such as numerical offeree or purchaser limitations 8 7 and the
general solicitation concept 288 remained relevant, but the crucial task for
issuers structuring private offerings became that of determining the abil-
ity of the investors to fend for themselves.
As the law under section 4(2) developed, the courts applied a subtle
exegesis to this concept, and began to distinguish between the investor's
ability to assess the merits of the investment opportunity-sophistica-
tion2 8 -and the ability to obtain the information needed for a sophisti-
cated assessment-access.29 ° The conventional wisdom soon reflected
the notion that both sophistication and access were required before in-
vestors would be deemed able to fend for themselves, 291 and the "suita-
bility" concept was eventually codified in rule 146,292 the first section
4(2) safe harbor rule.
This approach to section 4(2) spawned a series of practical questions
about how one could establish investor suitability. A complex body of
law and lore crystallized around investor suitability as financing under
the 1933 Act exemptions expanded during the 1970s.29 3 The practical
287. The Ralston Purina decision in fact stated expressly that "nothing prevents the commission,
in enforcing the statute, from using some kind of numerical test in deciding when to investigate
particular exemption claims." Id. at 125. For discussion of the extent to which the Commission
applied an informal numerical limitation under § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988), prior to its pro-
mulgation of rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (rescinded 1982) and rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506
(1989), both of which contained numerical limitations, see 3 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 8,
at 1364-70.
288. See ABA Section 4(2) Report, supra note 18, at 497.
289. For discussion of the evolution of the sophistication concept, see 3 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN,
supra note 8, at 1370-77. For criticism of the notion that offeree sophistication is necessary under
§ 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988), see Schneider, The Statutory Law of Private Placements, 14 REv.
SEC. REG. 869, 873-76 (1981).
290. The leading case defining "access" is Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893
(5th Cir. 1977), which stated a disjunctive requirement, Le., the offeree must have access to informa-
tion either by virtue of an insider position or bargaining power or through actual disclosure of the
material information. Id. at 905-06.
291. For detailed discussion of the role of the sophistication and access concepts under the statu-
tory exemption created by § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988), see ABA Section 4(2) Report, supra note
18, at 489-95.
292. Rule 146(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d) (rescinded 1982) imposed an offeree suitability require-
ment that required consideration not only of the offeree's sophistication but also of the offeree's
ability to bear the economic risk of the transaction. Rule 146(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (rescinded
1982), employed the Doran disjunctive approach to disclosure. For discussion of these aspects of
rule 146, see 3 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 1395-1400.
293. For a synthesis of this law and lore, see generally ABA Section 4(2) Report, supra note 18.
For discussion of the practical difficulties created by this legal framework, see Soraghan, Private
Offerings: Determining "Access," "Investment Sophistication, " and 'Ability to Bear Economic Risk,"
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difficulty of establishing the suitability of each investor on a case-by-case
basis, however, generated a need for a more objective means of determin-
ing suitability. Recognizing this need, the SEC developed the accredited
investor device, which consisted of objectively defined categories of inves-
tors deemed capable of fending for themselves. This device first surfaced
in 1980 in rule 242, discussed above, 2 91 and was carred over into Regula-
tion D under rules 505 and 506.
The accredited investor concept simplified exempt financing. Under
the statutory section 4(2) exemption and its rule 146 safe harbor, the
issuer had to establish its reasonable belief in the suitability of each inves-
tor. Under rules 505 and 506, on the other hand, the issuer's first inquiry
is into the accredited or non-accredited status of the investors-a far
more objective determination. Sophistication is totally irrelevant under
rule 505. Under rule 506, which requires non-accredited investors to be
sophisticated,295 the issuer need not establish investor sophistication if all
of the investors in the transaction are accredited. Once the accredited
status of an investor is established, furthermore, that investor may be
excluded from the number of investors who must be counted under the
purchaser limitations of rule 505296 and rule 506.297 In addition, issuers
selling only to accredited investors under these rules will not have to
provide any specific disclosure document as a condition of the
exemption.298
Issuers engaged in rule 505 or rule 506 transactions, therefore, tend to
concern themselves with individual investor sophistication only if they
must include some non-accredited investors in a rule 506 transaction, or
if they want to establish a fallback exemption under the statutory section
4(2) exemption. 299 The determination of whether investors can fend for
8 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1980). For criticism of the courts' approach to these issues, see Marsh, Who
Killed the Private Offering Exemption? A Legal Whodunit, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 470 (1976).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 76 and 92. The definition of accredited investor was set
out in rule 242(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (rescinded 1982).
295. Rule 506(b)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1989).
296. Rule 505(b)(2)(i), id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).
297. Rule 506(b)(2)(i), id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
298. Rule 502(b)(1), id. § 230.502(b)(1).
299. For discussion of the need to establish a fall-back statutory exemption in offerings under the
rule 506 safe harbor, see Nimkin, Offeree Sophistication in Private Offering, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 863,
869-70 (1982) (explaining the need to establish offeree sophistication in connection with a fall-back
statutory § 4(2) exemption); Seldin, Who Cares About Accredited Investors?, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 810,
813 (1982) (expressing belief that reliance on a fall-back statutory § 4(2) exemption will remain
important).
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themselves is thus now primarily a matter of deciding whether they fit
into the objective categories of accredited investor defined in rule
501(a). 3"° One can challenge the assumption that investors who fall into
these categories are able to fend for themselves, as Part V of this Article
will discuss,30 1 but the accredited investor concept has become central to
private and limited offerings under the 1933 Act. The SEC's continued
faith in the validity of this approach was reflected in its expansion of the
list of accredited investor categories during the 1987-1989 revisions.
Rule 501(a).defines an accredited investor as any person who fits, or
who the issuer reasonably believes to fit, within any of the categories set
out in that subsection.30 2 Many of these categories were expanded or
otherwise revised as a result of the 1987-1989 revisions.
L Rule 501(a)(1)-Institutional Investors
Rule 501(a)(1) previously included 30 3 certain institutional investors,
such as banks, insurance companies, registered investment companies,
and certain employee benefit plans covered by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).3° The SEC has expanded this list in sev-
eral ways. Savings and loan associations and credit unions are now in-
cluded. 30 5 Brokers and dealers registered under the 1934 Act have been
added, provided that they are purchasing for their own account. The
most significant changes, however, concern employee benefit plans. Pub-
lic employee benefit plans not covered by ERISA are now included, so
long as they have total assets in excess of $5 million. Specified private
employee benefit plans under ERISA continue to be covered by this sub-
section, but the eligibility requirements have been liberalized to include
plans whose plan fiduciary is a savings and loan association, and self-
directed plans whose investment decisions are made solely by accredited
investors.
2. Rule 501(a)(3)-Corporations and Other Business Entities
Perhaps the most important additions to the list of accredited investors
300. Rule 501(a)(1)-(8), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(I)-(8) (1989).
301. See infra text accompanying notes 377-80.
302. Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1989).
303. Rule 501(a)(1), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262.
304. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
305. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (1989).
[Vol. 68:225
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss2/2
THE NEW REGULATION D
can be found in rule 501(a)(3). 3 6 That subsection previously included3 17
only nonprofit organizations qualified under section 501(c)(3) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code 0 8 with total assets in excess of $5 million. Added
to those nonprofit organizations are corporations, business trusts and
partnerships with total assets in excess of $5 million, provided that the
entity was not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities
offered under Regulation D.a09 These additions fill a major gap in the
"accredited investor" definition. Previously, a corporation, business
trust or partnership that was not a financial institution such as those
specified in rule 501(a)(1) would not qualify as an accredited investor
even if it had an enormous annual income or net worth. Accredited in-
vestor status under the so-called "fat cat" net worth and annual income
categories was available only to natural persons.31 0 A large business cor-
poration could qualify as an accredited investor only if, under former
rule 501(a)(5),31' it purchased at least $150,000 of the securities being
offered. The additions to rule 501(a)(3) eliminate this anomaly, and pro-
vide ordinary business entities of sufficient size with their own accredited
investor category. This change also allowed the SEC to eliminate the
former rule 501(a)(5) "heavy hitter" or "big ticket" purchaser cate-
gory,312 which had been used mostly by those entities.
3. Rule 501(a)(6)-Annual Income Accredited Investors
This category of accredited investors previously included only natural
persons with an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the
two most recent years who reasonably expected an income in excess of
that amount in the current year.31 3 Added to this category is a person
who had a joint income of $300,000 with a spouse and who has a reason-
able expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year.3 14
Presumably, each spouse who has such a joint income will be considered
a separate accredited investor. The SEC thus expanded the annual in-
306. Id. § 230.501(a)(3).
307. Rule 501(a)(3), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,262.
308. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (Supp. V. 1987).
309. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3) (1989).
310. Rule 501(a)(6)-(7), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,263. These catego-
ries are now included in subsections 5-6 of rule 501(a). 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (1989).
311. Rule 501(a)(5), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,263 (rescinded 1988).
312. See Securities Act Release No. 6758, 53 Fed. Reg. at 7867.
313. Rule 501(a)(7), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,263 (now rule
501(a)(6)).
314. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (1989).
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come "fat cat" category by adding the so-called "yuppie" subcategory.
The net worth "fat cat" category, which characterizes persons with a net
worth of $1 million as accredited investors, was not revised because it
already allowed spouses' joint net worth to be taken into account. 315
4. Rule 501(a)(7)-Trusts
This new provision allows a trust to be accredited if it has $5 million in
total assets and. its investment decisions are made by a sophisticated in-
vestor, provided that the trust was not formed solely for purposes of the
investment.316 The provision is a parallel to rule 501(a)(3), which in-
cludes nonprofit organizations, corporations, partnerships and business
trusts that meet the $5 million asset test.317 The parallel is not complete,
however, because rule 501(a)(7) also requires that the trust's investment
decisions be made by a "sophisticated person.' 31 8 A sophisticated per-
son is defined by a cross-reference to rule 506(b)(2)(ii), which requires
non-accredited investors in rule 506 transactions to be sophisticated, and
defines such a person as one possessing "such knowledge and experience
in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the mer-
its and risks of the prospective investment. '319
This express incorporation of the section 4(2) and rule 506 sophistica-
tion concept into an "accredited investor" definition is notable as the first
departure from the strictly objective approach of the other "accredited
investor" definitions. This departure is troublesome. It will require the
type of subjective, case-by-case analysis of individual sophistication that
the accredited investor concept was intended to avoid. It also is by no
means clear whether the sophistication required of a trust fiduciary
under rule 501(a)(7) will be the same as that required of a mere pur-
chaser of securities under section 4(2) or rule 506, despite the cross-refer-
ence to rule 506(b)(2)(ii). Arguably, rule 501(a)(7) might require a
higher threshold of sophistication on the part of a plan fiduciary than an
ordinary individual investor.
315. Id. § 230.501(a)(5). It was, however, renumbered. This subsection was formerly rule
501(a)(6), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,263.
316. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(7) (1989).
317. Id. § 230.501(a)(3).
318. Id. § 230.501(a)(7).
319. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
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C. Reduction of Compliance Costs for Small Business Issuers
As discussed in Part 11,320 one of the principal goals of the original
Regulation D was the reduction of the regulatory burden on small busi-
ness issuers. A desire to make Regulation D even more useful to small
business issuers was one of the key principles by which Regulation D was
reformed in 1987-1989. In one sense, this principle informed all of the
revisions, because anything that made the exemptions easier and cheaper
to use would be of particular value to smaller issuers. Certain revisions,
however, were more directly intended to benefit small business issuers.
1. A More Useful Rule 504
Rule 504 was the aspect of the original Regulation D most clearly in-
tended to reduce small business issuers' compliance costs. The rule was,
in essence, an exemption for a class of relatively small offerings in which
the federal interest was too slight to justify detailed federal regulation.321
Regulation of such transactions could be left to the states, who would
have a greater interest in what tended to be highly localized transactions.
This deferral to state regulation generated its own problems, because
state treatment of rule 504 transactions was neither uniform nor neces-
sarily flexible,322 but rule 504 reduced compliance costs by eliminating
most federal exemptive conditions for transactions under the rule.
As experience under rule 504 evolved, however, some practical diffi-
culties emerged. Rule 504 originally limited the aggregate offering price
of securities sold under the rule to $500,000.323 This amount was an
improvement over the $100,000 permitted under rule 240,324 rule 504's
predecessor, but it soon proved inadequate as the costs of new business
formation continued to increase.325 In the recent revisions, the SEC at-
tempted to balance the demand for a higher aggregate offering price with
its own reluctance to permit larger offerings under rule 504 by tying an
320. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
321. See supra note 99.
322. For discussion of the difficulties in coordinating rule 504. with parallel state exemptions
(and of a possible solution), see Harris, Keller, Stakias & Liles, Financing the 'American Dream "-
Small Business and the ULOR Project, 43 Bus. LAW. 757 (1988); Harris, Keller, Stakias and Liles,
Financing the "American Dream " A Beginning, 44 Bus. LAW. 625 (1989).
323. Rule 504(b)(2), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
324. See id. at 11,257-58 (discussing change from the $100,000 ceiling under rule 240).
325. See Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,800 (citing criticism of the rule 240
$100,000 ceiling).
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increase in the aggregate offering price to a higher level of state
regulation.
Rule 504(b)(2)(i) now permits an aggregate offering price of up to $1
million in a twelve-month period, so long as no more than $500,000 of
that amount is "attributable" to offers and sales of securities without reg-
istration under a state's securities laws. 26 The operation of this limit is
fairly simple.
Assume that an issuer sells on January 1 $250,000 of its securities pur-
suant to a state registration in Massachusetts and another $250,000 pur-
suant to a registration in Maine. Assume further the January offering is
exempt on the federal level under rule 504. The issuer may sell another
$500,000 of its securities under rule 504 during the next twelve-month
period without state registration, because no more than $500,000 of the
offering would lave been sold without state registration.327 If, however,
the issuer had registered $250,000 of its securities in Massachusetts, but
had sold the $250,000 Maine portion of the offering pursuant to a state
exemption, then the issuer could sell no more than an additional
$250,000 under rule 504 without state registration, for a total of
$750,000. Otherwise, the issuer would have sold more than $500,000 of
securities without state registration.
This mechanism should prove practicable. It probably will be smaller
offerings that will rely on state exemptions rather than state registration
and hence will not need the higher ceiling on the aggregate offering price.
Conversely, issuers that need to raise $1 million should be able to afford
the additional cost of state registration, especially in nonmerit jurisdic-
tions or jurisdictions with a simplified registration mechanism tailored to
offerings of that size.328
Another liberalization of rule 504 also shows the linkage of federal
deregulation to compliance with state securities laws. Rule 504(b)(1)
previously provided that the rule 502(c) ban on general solicitation and
the rule 502(d) resale restrictions would not apply to rule 504 transac-
tions made exclusively in states requiring registration of the securities
and delivery of a disclosure document.329 Issues not registered in every
state in which they were" offered remained subject to rules 502(c) and (d).
326. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1989).
327. For a similar example, see 1d. note 1, example 1.
328. For discussion of NASAA's recent development of such a mechanism, see infra text accom-
panying notes 394-97.
329. Rule 504(b)(1), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
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The SEC amended rule 504(b)(1) 330 to take into account the lack of a
securities registration procedure in some jurisdictions, notably New York
and the District of Columbia. 331 The following example illustrates the
effect of the amendment. Under the original version of rule 504(b)(1), a
rule 504 offering registered in Maryland and Virginia would remain sub-
ject to the rule 502(c) and (d) restrictions if the offering were also made
in the District of Columbia, which does not register securities. Under
new rule 504(b)(1)(i), the restrictions will not apply even if the securities
are offered in a jurisdiction without a registration procedure, if the fol-
lowing conditions are met: (1) the securities are registered in at least one
state that proyides for registration and delivery of a disclosure document;
(2) offers and sales are made in the state of registration in compliance
with that state's requirements; and (3) the disclosure document is deliv-
ered to all purchasers prior to sale in the jurisdictions without a registra-
tion procedure.332
In this example, transactions in the District of Columbia would not
create a problem so long as the conditions listed above are met. Presum-
ably, however, the offering would still have to be registered in each of the
other two states that have a registration procedure. The offering could
not be registered in Virginia and sold under an exemption in Maryland
and still qualify for the exclusion from the general solicitation and resale
restrictions. The relief provided by rule 504(b)(1)(ii) extends only to of-
ferings that are registered in every jurisdiction except those without reg-
istration mechanisms.
2. A New Exemption for Small Issuer Employee Benefit Plans
As discussed in Part 1I,333 one of the controversial aspects of the 1987-
1989 rulemaking was the new exemption for certain employee benefit
plans.334 This exemption, which is technically not part of Regulation D
but is functionally and historically related to it,335 permits the offer and
sale of securities by issuers not reporting under the 1934 Act if pursuant
to "compensatory benefit plans" or written contracts between the issuer
330. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (1989).
331. See Securities Act Release No. 6758, 53 Fed. Reg. at 7867 (the rule 'us intended to accom-
modate offerings in large metropolitan areas where the central jurisdiction has no registration pro-
cess but the surrounding jurisdictions do, e.g., New York and the District of Columbia").
332. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)(ii) (1989).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 170-76.
334. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.701-.703(T) (1989).
335. See supra note 176.
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or its affiliates and its employees, directors, general partners, trustees (if a
business trust), officers, and consultants and advisers.336 The sole pur-
pose of the exemption is to facilitate smaller issuers' use of securities for
compensation by reducing securities compliance costs. A preliminary
note to these rules states expressly that rule 701 does not exempt offers
and sales designed to raise capital.337 An issuer thus may use the exemp-
tion only for compensatory purposes.
Determining the amount of securities that may be sold under rule 701
requires consideration of two numbers: (1) the aggregate offering price of
securities of the issuer subject to outstanding offers made in reliance on
rule 701, plus (2) the amount of securities of the issuer sold in reliance on
rule 701 in the preceding twelve months.33 The combined amount of
securities subject to offers or already sold may not exceed the greater of
$500,000 or an amount determined under two different formulas.339 The
first formula limits the amount of securities subject to offers and the
amount of securities sold to fifteen percent of the total assets of the is-
suer, measured at the end of the issuer's last fiscal year.340 The second
formula provides that the amount shall not exceed fifteen percent of the
outstanding securities of the class being offered.341 Whichever of these
two formulas is used, however, the aggregate offering price of securities
subject to outstanding offers and sold in the preceding twelve months
under rule 701 may not exceed $5 million.34 2
In view of the special nature of the employee benefit plan offerings
covered by rule 701, unique aggregation and integration rules apply to
the exemption. Even though rule 701 is a section 3(b) limited offering
exemption, offerings under other section 3(b) rules such as rule 504 or
rule 505 need not be aggregated with rule 701 transactions for purposes
of determining the aggregate offering price of a rule 701 offering.343 Only
the amount of other offerings under rule 701 within the preceding twelve-
336. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(b)(1) (1989). "Compensatory benefit plan" is defined as "any
purchase, savings, option, bonus, stock appreciation, profit sharing, thrift, incentive, pension or simi-
lar plan." Id. § 230.701(b)(2).
337. Id. § 230.701 preliminary note 5. See also Securities Act Release No. 6768, 53 Fed. Reg. at
12,919 ("the purpose of the rule is to facilitate the use of securities for compensation").
338. 17 C.F.R. § 210.701(b)(5) (1989).
339. Id.
340. Id. § 230.701(b)(5)(i).
341. Id. § 230.701(b)(5)(ii).
342. Id. § 230.701(b)(5).
343. Id. § 230.701(b)(4)(ii).
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month period need be considered for aggregation purposes."s4 Similarly,
no transactions under any other exemption will be integrated into a rule
701 offering, and rule 701 transactions will not be integrated into offer-
ings under other exemptions.34 5
Rule 701 imposes no other exemptive conditions except for a restric-
tion on resale. 46 Rule 702, however, requires a simple postcommence-
ment notice filing on Form 701 and an annual report.34 7 While the rule
702 filing is technically mandatory, rule 703348 takes the same approach
to failures to file as rule 507. 34' The exemption is not lost for the present
offering. Rather, rule 703 disqualifies from future use of the exemption
any issuer who has been subject to specified judicial action for failure to
comply with the rule 702 filing requirement, unless the Commission
waives the disqualification upon a showing of good cause.35 0 The SEC
intends rules 702 and 703, however, to be only temporary rules.35 1 They
may eventually be eliminated if the SEC determines that they are no
longer needed.352
3. A Lighter Disclosure Burden
Rule 502(b) defines the circumstances under which specified types of
disclosure must be made as a condition of the exemption.35 3 The cost of
complying with these detailed disclosure requirements has long been a
subject of complaint, particularly with respect to smaller offerings.3 54
Prior to the recent revisions, the only recognition of the disproportion-
ate impact of disclosure requirements on smaller offerings was a distinc-
tion between offerings up to $5 million and those in excess of $5
million. 5  Offerings in excess of that amount had to be made by means
344. Id.
345. Id. § 230.701(b)(6).
346. Id. § 230.701(c). Securities issued pursuant to rule 701 are deemed to be "restricted securi-
ties" that cannot be resold without registration or an exemption therefrom. Id. § 230.701(c)(1)-(2).
A mechanism for resale of securities under rule 144, id. § 230.144 is provided by id. § 230.701(c)(3).
347. Id. § 230.702(T)(a).
348. Id. § 230.703(T).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 231-38.
350. 17 C.F.R. § 230.703(T)(a)-(b) (1989).
351. See id. § 230.702(T)(e), .703(T)(c) which provide that rules 702 and 703 will remain effec-
tive for only five years from the effective date of those rules.
352. Securities Act Release No. 6768, 53 Fed. Reg. at 12,920.
353. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (1989).
354. See the authorities cited supra note 103.
355. Rule 502(b)(2)(A)-(B), Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,264-65.
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of a disclosure document containing the information required by Part I
of a 1933 Act registration statement.35 6 Offerings below $5 million, how-
ever, could provide the type of information required by SEC Form S-18,
a short-form 1933 Act registration statement that allows somewhat ab-
breviated disclosures. 7
In recognition of the burdens that even Form S-18 type disclosure
could impose on smaller offerings, the SEC amended rule 502(b) to pro-
vide that offerings of up to $2 million in aggregate offering price need
provide only the type of disclosure required by Regulation A plus an
audited balance sheet.358 Regulation A requires a more modest level of
disclosure than Form S-18. 3 5 9 Furthermore, offerings of up to $7.5 mil-
lion, rather than $5 million, may now provide Form S-18 type disclosure;
only offerings in excess of $7.5 million must provide a higher level of
disclosure.360
V. A DEFENSE OF THE NEW REGULATION D
A. Reduced Costs for Small Business Issuers Without Increased Risks
for Investors
Do the many changes to Regulation D make sense? Are they defensi-
ble as a matter of public policy? For most securities issuers, the answers
to these questions surely must be yes. While the 1987-1989 revisions
may not have produced as liberal a Regulation D as some may have
wished, they do reflect an expansion of most issuers' ability to offer secur-
ities on an exempt basis. Regulation D offerings, in the aggregate, should
be less costly, and, from the issuer's perspective, less precarious.
From other perspectives, however, the new Regulation D might ap-
pear to worsen an already bad situation. Those who believe that the orig-
inal Regulation D simply provided a broad conduit for fraud will hardly
356. Rule 502(b)(2)(B), id. at 11,264-65.
357. Rule 502(b)(2)(A), id. at 11,264. For discussion of the disclosure requirements of Form S-
18, see Securities Act Release No. 6049 (Apr. 3, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 21,562, 21,567 (1979); Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6489 (Sept. 23, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 45,386, 45,387-88 (1983).
358. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A) (1989). The specific reference in this subsection is to Part
II of Form I-A, 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (1989). The audited balance sheet must be dated within 120 days
of the start of the offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A) (1989).
359. Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.264 (1989), unlike Form S-18, does not require audited
financial statements, and requires less detailed narrative disclosures than does Form S-18. The cru-
cial effect of this change, therefore, was to eliminate the requirement of audited financial statements
for offerings under $2 million, and to require only an audited balance sheet.
360. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)-(C) (1989).
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approve the new substantial compliance concept, expanded categories of
accredited investors, reduced filing and disclosure requirements or most
of the other changes in the rules. Some state administrators already have
made their feelings known about these developments, 361 and can be ex-
pected to fight a rear-guard action at the state level.
This Article takes the position that the 1987-1989 revisions do make
sense, and are defensible as a matter of public policy. The arguments in
support of this position, furthermore, extend not only to the recent revi-
sions, but to all of Regulation D itself.
Both the original Regulation D and the 1987-1989 revisions perhaps
can best be justified in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. These rules im-
plicitly recognize that the benefits to investors generated by the 1933 Act
registration process are not without costs, and that in at least some con-
texts the costs outweigh the benefits. Of course, the strongest version of
this argument would proceed from the assumption that the 1933 Act
registration system generates few if any benefits, either because firms
have sufficient private incentives to disclose362 or because the mandated
disclosure is useless or not very important to most investors. 363 If that
assumption is correct,314 then the cost-benefit equation is totally skewed;
the substantial costs of the registration system completely outweigh the
few or nonexistent benefits to investors.
Even if one were skeptical about that strong form of the argument,365
and were to assume that the 1933 Act registration process generates at
361. See supra text accompanying notes 207-14.
362. Arguments to this effect have been made by W. BEAVER, FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN
ACCOUNTING REVOLUTION 13 (1981); H. KRIPKE, supra note 86, at 119; S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER,
THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 50 (1981); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306, 313, 323, 326 (1976);
Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Sig-
naling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (F. Edwards ed. 1979).
363. Kripke has been the principal proponent of this argument. See his works cited supra note
86.
364. The argument that the SEC's mandatory disclosure system does not benefit investors has
been analyzed in empirical terms by Stigler, supra note 82, and Jarrell, The Economic Effects of
Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J. L. & ECON. 613 (1981), who both
argued that the SEC's mandatory disclosure rules did not produce benefits observable in the form of
returns to investors.
365. For critical analysis of the claim that issuers have sufficient private incentives to disclose,
see Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L.
REV. 717, 738-47 (1984); Seligman, supra note 73, at 5-8 n.24. For critical discussion of the argu-
ment based on empirical analysis of returns to investors, see Friend & Herman, The SEC Through a
Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382 (1964); Seligman, supra note 73, at 11-45.
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least some important benefits, the analysis would still not be complete. It
would be crucial to recognize, for example, that the value of those bene-
fits in certain market contexts may be less than in others. The SEC itself
appeared to reach such a conclusion when it developed its integrated dis-
closure166 and shelf registration 367 systems. Both of those systems sub-
stantially reduce the scale of 1933 Act disclosure and administrative
review in connection with offerings by certain widely-followed issuers.
The systems expressly recognize that traditional 1933 Act registration
provides relatively few investor benefits with respect to offerings by issu-
ers whose securities are traded in efficient markets and who have already
generated large amounts of publicly available information under the 1934
Act.368  If traditional 1933 Act mandatory disclosure is largely superflu-
ous in that market context, then its "benefits" are largely illusory and
cannot outweigh the costs of full compliance with 1933 Act registration
requirements.3 69 Hence, the integrated disclosure and shelf registration
366. The integrated disclosure system has been explained in the following terms:
The "integrated disclosure system" has two major aspects: (1) It coordinates required dis-
closures under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, in light of an assumption of the efficient
market hypothesis that information effectively disseminated to the public will be rapidly
reflected in share prices regardless of the source of the data. This aspect of the system is
responsible for streamlined registration forms, notably Forms S-2 and S-3, for registrants
subject to the 1934 Act's continuous disclosure obligations; (2) The system developed ge-
neric disclosure items for both 1933 Act registration and 1934 Act registration .... Previ-
ously required disclosures under the two Acts had been developed independently of each
other (citations omitted).
2 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 604-05.
367. The SEC's "shelf registration" system is the product of rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415
(1989). In essence,
Rule 415 permits the registration of securities that an issuer intends to "put on the shelf"
rather than sell immediately. By having a block of "shelf registered" securities available,
an issuer avoids the delay of the registration process once the decision is made to proceed
with a sale. Shelf registration also gives an issuer the flexibility to seek bids from a group of
competing underwriters and bypasses the traditional method of negotiating a fixed price in
advance of sale with just one underwriting syndicate.
Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analy.
sis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1005-06 (1984).
368. The SEC's reliance on efficient market theory in adopting the integrated disclosure system
was made express in Securities Act Release No. 6235 (Sept. 2, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,694
(1980); Securities Act Release No. 6331 (Aug. 6, 1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902, 41,904-05 (1981);
Securities Act Release No. 6383 (Mar. 3, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,382-85 (1982). The impor-
tance of the theory to creation of the shelf registration system was equally clear. See Fox, supra note
367, at 1008. For a thorough analysis of the efficient market hypothesis and its application to securi-
ties regulatory policy, see Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549 (1984).
369. For a debate over the question of whether the shelf registration system deprives investors of
the benefits created by underwriter due diligence in traditional nonshelf 1933 Act registration
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systems eliminate the need for much of that compliance.
Relaxation of 1933 Act requirements also may be justified when the
costs in specific market contexts may be too high to justify the benefits,
even if those benefits are substantial. In contrast to securities sold under
the integrated disclosure or shelf registration systems, the types of securi-
ties exempted under Regulation D tend not to be sold in efficient mar-
kets.3 7 ° One might assume that purchasers of such securities would
benefit from the due diligence process, formalized disclosure and admin-
istrative review required by 1933 Act registration. On the other hand,
the costs of due diligence, audited financial statements and administra-
tive delays, as well as substantial opportunity costs, are disproportion-
ately high for smaller issuers raising relatively small amounts of money
because the costs remain relatively constant. 371 Those costs also are par-
ticularly insupportable for companies who need access to investors other
than venture capitalists or banks.
The costs of 1933 Act compliance for small business, therefore, may
outweigh the benefits that 1933 Act registration would provide to inves-
tors. This is not to suggest that the federal government's interest in in-
vestor protection is trivial, or that it should be ignored in this market
context. Rather, this interest should be balanced against other legitimate
interests and in this particular context the interest in facilitating capital
formation justifies substantial exemptions from the 1933 Act registration
requirement. This sense of balance has characterized Regulation D since
the beginning, and continued to do so in the 1987-1989 revisions. The
new exemption for certain employee benefit plans, the increased aggre-
gate offering price ceiling for rule 504 offerings, and the reduced disclo-
sure requirements for smaller offerings are but the clearest examples on
point.
Critics of Regulation D might concede that small business needs regu-
latory relief, while arguing that Regulation D has not served primarily as
a small business financing mechanism, but rather as a loophole for tax
advantaged oil and gas and real estate limited partnership syndicators
processes, compare Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and ShelfRegistration: An Anal-
ysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135 (1984), with Fox, supra note 367.
370. See Coffee, supra note 365, at 731 (arguing that not all securities are sold in "efficient"
markets).
371. For discussion of the data supporting this conclusion see Seligman, supra note 73, at 57-59.
For discussion of the costs of compliance with 1933 Act registration requirements, see S. PHILLIPS &
J. ZECHER, supra note 362, at 27-51; Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protec-
tion of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 708-09 (1984).
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and, even worse, as an open invitation to fraud.372
At least three responses might be made to that cluster of assumptions
and conclusions. First, the use of Regulation D by some larger issuers
does not contradict the fact that small business issuers also routinely rely
on it.373 The Regulation is crucial to small business issuers of every type,
ranging from those at the start-up stage relying on rule 504 to more ma-
ture small companies needing rules 505 or 506 for an additional round of
financing prior to a public offering.374 Regulation D is the key to reduc-
tion of their disproportionate compliance burden. To the extent that
larger issuers use the Regulation, a separate and additional justification
lies in the many conditions and requirements that provide substantial
protection to investors. In any event, the use of Regulation D by some
nonsmall business issuers does not obviate the Regulation's usefulness as
a means of relieving small business's disproportionate compliance
burden.
Second, the assumption that Regulation D is somehow inherently
linked with fraud has never been established empirically, and no unique
causal relationship has been articulated convincingly. One sometimes
hears anecdotal evidence about the depredations of Regulation D issuers,
but such stories can be counterbalanced with anecdotal evidence of simi-
lar abuses by issuers of registered offerings. For example, penny stock
issuers often have perpetrated frauds and other abuses despite apparent
compliance with 1933 Act registration requirements.375 The availability
372. The most persuasive proponent of arguments to this effect has been Professor Seligman.
See Seligman, supra note 73, at 58-60 (criticizing the SEC for failing to recognize that broadened
small firm exemptions would increase the likelihood of securities fraud).
373. The SEC's analysis of the first year of use of Regulation D showed that limited partnerships
claimed 66% of Regulation D filings and 55% of the aggregate value. Corporations accounted for,
32% of the filings and 43% of the value. SEC, Analysis, supra note 4, at 17. Assuming, arguendo,
that limited partnerships should be excluded from the category of small business (a by no means self-
evident proposition), it remains that a very large percentage of the users of Regulation D were
corporate issuers. The same study found further that most of the corporate issuers were closely held,
and many were in the start-up stage. Id. at 23. Of particular importance to such smaller corporate
issuers was rule 504. Id. at 17, 23-24.
374. See id. at 24 table 7, showing continued reliance on Regulation D, albeit at lower rates, by
emerging companies beyond the start-up stage.
375. Accounts of serious problems of investor abuse in penny stock offerings have become com-
mon in the popular press. See Boland, Confessions of a Penny-Stock Broker, SYLVIA PORTER'S PER-
SONAL FINANCE, Sept. 1988, at 65; Quinn, The War on Penny Stocks, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 1989, at
52. The SEC has recently acted under the 1934 Act to control penny stock abuses by imposing
stringent sales practice requirements on broker-dealers selling such securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-
6 (1989). For discussion, see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27,160 (Aug. 22, 1989), 54 Fed.
Reg. 35,468 (1989).
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of an exemption such as Regulation D may make it cheaper for some
issuers to take advantage of investors, but the scale and nature of the
correlation between fraud or overreaching and the exempt status of se-
curities offerings remains to be determined.
Third, objections to Regulation D often are really indirect objections
to the type of offering exempted under the Regulation. Regulation D
may appear suspect to some because it has so well served syndicators of
tax-advantaged limited partnerships. This is a case of throwing the pro-
verbial baby out with the bathwater. If there is a problem with abusive
tax shelters, the problem should be addressed as a matter of tax policy
and not as a matter of securities regulatory policy. Even the subtler ver-
sion of this critique-that Regulation D facilitates abusive tax shelters by
allowing them to be marketed more cheaply-misses or at least underval-
ues this basic point. The applicability of 1933 Act registration require-
ments does nothing to prevent economically questionable transactions
when markets for those transactions exist. The recent dismal experience
with SEC-registered, publicly offered limited partnerships is a case in
point.3 76
These criticisms of Regulation D and its recent expansion also implic-
itly assume that investors are in fact being left vulnerable to exploitation
by the unscrupulous. This assumption is not entirely credible. It fails, in
particular, to take into account the crucial role of the accredited investor
concept under Regulation D.
In many respects, the accredited investor concept is the heart of Regu-
lation D. As explained above in Part IV,37 7 accredited investors are per-
sons or entities deemed, according to objective standards, able to fend for
themselves. Accredited investors, like sophisticated investors under sec-
tion 4(2) and rule 506, do not need the protection that registration would
provide. They either are capable of evaluating the merits of the offering
or have sufficient resources to purchase the expertise needed for that
evaluation. In particular, they are able to purchase the advice they need
to invest on a diversified basis in accordance with portfolio theory, al-
lowing them to hedge the substantial risks usually associated with Regu-
376. See Bettner, Investors Continue to Shun Offerings of New Public Limited Partnerships, Wall
St. J., Oct. 13, 1989, § 3, at 9, col. 1 (describing how serious economic problems with existing public
limited partnerships have led investors to shun new offerings); Bettner & Power, Morning After:
Limited Partnerships Are Often Faltering, To Investors'Dismay, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1989, § 1, at 1,
col. 6 (describing severe difficulties encountered by those who invested billions of dollars in public
limited partnerships).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 294-302.
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lation D-type securities with investments in other types of securities or in
nonsecurities investments.37 They also presumably have the ability to
bargain for the information they need or to decide when particular types
of information are not needed. It is thus difficult to justify regulatory
intervention in their decision-making process. In fact, it is difficult to
justify either the imposition of additional costs on capital formation or
the expenditure of public resources for the purpose of "protecting" such
investors.
It may be argued that Regulation D's attempt to objectify the class of
persons able to fend for themselves is foolishly optimistic, because a per-
son with a high net worth or annual income may be totally unsophistica-
ted, and some institutional investors-savings and loan associations, for
instance-may be even more feckless than individuals.379  It also may be
pointed out that there is no empirical evidence establishing that such in-
vestors can fend for themselves, and that plenty of at least anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that "widows and orphans" are not the only suckers in
the world.38 0 The fact remains, however, that all individuals or entities
who fall within the various accredited investor categories, including the
individual annual income and net worth categories, have the financial
ability to purchase the advice they need. Some investors in those catego-
ries may "need" protection from their own greed, laziness or feckless-
ness, but do they deserve that protection? Should "protecting" such
investors be a priority of the regulatory system, especially in light of the
costs of providing such protection? A regulatory system that answers
these questions affirmatively may be providing an unneeded subsidy to
the undeserving. The 1987-1989 additions to the list of accredited inves-
tors, therefore, merely improved upon an already sound approach and
made it even more workable.
378. This is not to suggest that portfolio theory eliminates the need for some sort of mandatory
disclosure system. As both Coffee and Seligman have argued (albeit on different grounds) portfolio
theory does not satisfy the ordinary investor's total informational needs. Coffee, supra note 365, at
750-51; Seligman, supra note 73, at 4-5 n.23. It is to suggest, however, that accredited investors, as
defined in Regulation D, have greater capacities for extracting and evaluating material information
than do ordinary investors, and that these capacities will allow them to diversify their investments
more effectively than ordinary investors. Government-mandated disclosure in transactions with ac-
credited investors thus may be relatively superfluous.
379. See Warren, supra note 22, at 382 ("Experience indicates that the wealthy often do not have
the sophistication to demand access to material information or otherwise to evaluate the merits and
risks of a prospective investment").
380. Id. ("It is important to note that the categories of'wealthy' investors frequently include the
widows and orphans whose protection traditionally has been the sacred trust of the SEC").
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The other changes to Regulation D also make the exemptions more
practicable without creating a new window of vulnerability for investors.
The reduced disclosure requirements for smaller offerings, for example,
relate principally to the form of disclosure and the amounts of audited
financial data required. The changes reduce the risk of a registration
violation for failure to comply with a technical disclosure requirement,
while leaving intact the issuer's incentive to disclose all material informa-
tion in order to minimize potential antifraud liability.
Similarly, neither rule 507 nor rule 508 create new risks for investors.
The SEC never intended the rule 503 filing requirement to have any di-
rect impact on investor protection; the Commission designed it as a
means of collecting data about the use of the exemptions. The SEC ap-
parently never used these filings as a market-monitoring mechanism for
enforcement purposes. 381 Investor plaintiffs in civil actions against issu-
ers perhaps may have used violations of the filing requirement as an easy
way to gain settlement leverage, but it hardly seems appropriate to pro-
tect their litigational edge. Civil liability in private actions should be
based on more substantive violations of those requirements that were ac-
tually intended to protect investors. The elimination of this element of
leverage may worsen the field position of some plaintiffs in litigation aris-
ing under Regulation D, but the disproportionate risk to issuers makes
this marginal benefit to investors hard to justify.
The new substantial compliance concept is perhaps even more innocu-
ous. First, the operation of the concept is quite narrow and specific. It
does not even apply in SEC enforcement actions, thus leaving an entire
zone of liability untouched.382 The concept is also totally inapplicable to
violations of the general solicitation ban, the rule 504 and rule 505 ag-
gregate offering price limitations, and the rule 505 and rule 506 pur-
chaser limitations.38 3  In addition, it does not provide complete
protection from liability; it only protects against liability to those persons
who were not injured by the violation.38 4
Second, as explained above in Part IV,3 85 the SEC did not intend the
new rule to encourage a "close is good enough" approach to Regulation
D compliance. Both the plain language of rule 508 and the SEC's une-
381. Securities Act Release No. 6650, 51 Fed. Reg. at 21,378-80.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 279-82.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 265-71.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 257-64.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 274-78.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
292 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
quivocal utterances show that reliance on rule 508 should be a last-ditch
measure used ex post in litigation to protect an issuer against the type of
highly disproportionate liability that made Regulation D so risky to use.
Rule 508 may inject some uncertainty into litigation over Regulation D,
but it should not have any substantial impact on the level of compliance
under the rules. Substantial incentives for full compliance remain intact;
rule 508 simply will provide some comfort for those whose good faith
efforts at full compliance somehow fall short. The only important policy
question is whether the SEC has been too restrictive in denying substan-
tial compliance relief to violations of the general solicitation ban and the
aggregate offering price and purchaser limitations.
Taken as a whole, the foregoing arguments lead to a simple conclu-
sion: Regulation D substantially reduces the costs of compliance for
small business issuers without substantially increasing investors' risk of
fraud or overreaching. This conclusion justifies not only the original
adoption of Regulation D but its recent expansion. Another key justifi-
cation, however, should be kept in mind.
B. Superior Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities
A central dilemma of securities regulation in the United States is that
of defining the proper allocation of regulatory responsibilities between
the federal government and the states. The state securities administra-
tors and the SEC have overlapping jurisdiction over a vast number of
transactions.386 Legal devices have been developed to make this terribly
nonsystematic "system" workable,3 87 but there has been no comprehen-
sive effort to define those segments of the securities markets best regu-
lated by the SEC and those best regulated by the states. Rule 504 of
Regulation D, however, is a step in the right direction.
From the beginning, rule 504 represented an attempt to define a class
of small offerings in which the federal interest was de minimis, and with
respect to which deferral to state regulation was appropriate."5 8 "Defer-
ral to state regulation" in this context meant that the SEC would impose
minimal conditions for exemption of certain smaller offerings, on the as-
sumption that those offerings either would comply with more stringent
state exemptions or would be registered in every state in which the offer-
386. See ABA Merit Report, supra note 8, at 791; Sargent, supra note 116, at 1029-37.
387. An example is the state "registration by coordination" device. See ABA Merit Report, supra
note 8, at 798-99.
388. See supra text accompanying note 99.
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ings were made. To encourage state registration, rule 504 provided the
incentive of relief from most of the remaining federal exemptive condi-
tions if the offering were in fact state-registered.389 In short, rule 504
created a neat and practicable division of regulatory responsibilities. 390
All of the 1987-1989 changes to rule 504 reflect the same philosophy
and are directed toward the same end. The SEC increased the ceiling on
the aggregate offering price to $1 million, but tied the availability of the
higher ceiling to state registration, and eliminated an anomaly that made
it impossible for issuers to take full advantage of rule 504 when selling in
jurisdictions without registration mechanisms. 391 The sole remaining is-
sue is whether the states will develop a simplified registration mechanism
appropriate to $1 million registered offerings.
In any event, rule 504 is a positive attempt to resolve at least one as-
pect of a persistent problem of federalism. The revisions to rule 504
show that the SEC is continuing to take the type of creative and balanced
approach that has characterized the Regulation D enterprise since the
beginning and that makes its defense possible. One should not read this
Article's defense of the basic approach implicit in Regulation D and its
recent revisions, however, as suggesting perfection. Much remains to be
done.
VI. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA
There remain three principal problems with Regulation D. Two of
those problems are within the SEC's purview; the other is primarily the
responsibility of NASAA and the states.
A. Greater Coordination of State and Federal Regulation of Limited
and Private Offerings
One of the principal points of this Article is that reform of securities
regulatory policy is not just a matter of deciding what makes sense philo-
sophically, but of deciding what will work in the context of a joint state-
federal system of securities regulation. Evaluation of regulatory policy,
therefore, has to take into account not only the costs of compliance with
federal law, but also the costs of compliance with parallel aspects of state
law.
389. See supra text accompanying note 40.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 330-32.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
294 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Those state-generated costs are more than a matter of paying a few
extra filing fees or spending a bit more on legal research.392 The law that
determines the structure of an exempt transaction is the law of the most
restrictive state in which the offering must be sold. In that sense, the
states have had the last word on Regulation D. If the investors in a
particular transaction are located in a jurisdiction that imposes more
stringent conditions than any of the Regulation D rules, then those con-
ditions will prevail. The advantages provided by Regulation D will go
for naught. The persistence of state exemptive conditions more restric-
tive than those of Regulation D thus causes the aggregate costs of securi-
ties compliance to increase.
Even more costly is the lack of uniformity among the state coordinat-
ing exemptions. Here the problem is not necessarily that the state coor-
dinating exemptions are more restrictive than the Regulation D
exemptions, but that they are different from each other. The Uniform
Limited Offering Exemption is uniform in name only. The state adminis-
trators have not been able to resist hanging all sorts of bells and whistles
on their versions of ULOE, and hence upon Regulation D itself.3 93 The
net result is that rule 505 and 506 transactions are "doable," but only
after expensive and time-consuming efforts to comply with an ever-shift-
ing constellation of idiosyncratic state coordinating exemptions. Com-
pounding the difficulty, and undermining the progress made in the recent
revisions of Regulation D, is the omnipresent risk of liability for failing to
comply with one or more states' exemptive requirements.
For the states to insist that this is simply a matter of the exercise of
sovereign power in the interests of investors is self-indulgent. While the
states may possess the constitutional authority to regulate in this manner,
their insistence on maintaining a nonuniform hodgepodge of exemptions
subverts the SEC's careful and systematic attempt to balance the legiti-
mate needs of capital formation and investor protection, and shows an
indifference to essential national concerns.
The solution? Only widespread adoption of a truly uniform state coor-
dinating exemption for rule 505 and 506 transactions will preserve the
appropriate regulatory balance. This will require many state administra-
392. There has been no comprehensive theoretical or empirical analysis of the costs generated by
state securities regulation. A promising work-in-progress, however, is a study sponsored by the
Small Business Administration. Office of Advocacy, United States Small Business Administration,
The Effect of State Securities Laws on Small Business Capital Formation (Nov. 1, 1988).
393. See supra authorities cited note 135.
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tors to adopt a far more cooperative spirit than they have demonstrated
so far, but progress in that direction is both possible and necessary. The
ultimate result should be state rules that do not superimpose additional
or inconsistent state requirements upon rule 505 and 506 transactions,
but make compliance with those rules the crux of both state and federal
exemption. Unfortunately, NASAA's legal incapacity to impose a uni-
form solution upon its members and its political inability to forge a con-
sensus among them shows the profound weakness of the current purely
voluntary approach to state-federal coordination, and does not bode well
for the future.
With respect to rule 504 transactions, the issue is more complicated.
Unlike rules 505 and 506, rule 504 represents an express deferral to state
regulation.394 State exemptions directly coordinated with rule 504 thus
would be neither desirable nor consistent with the intent of rule 504.
Transactions under this rule should be subjected to a higher degree of
regulation at the state level than the minimal regulation applied at the
federal level. These transactions are typically too small and localized to
justify federal intervention, but the states do have a legitimate interest in
regulating them. The goal therefore should not be the development of
state rules that hinge state exemption upon compliance with rule 504;
something more should be required at the state level.
This is not to say, however, that rule 504 transactions do not need
some sort of special treatment by the states. These offerings, after all, are
typically the quintessential small business offerings by issuers who cannot
afford the cost of an ordinary, full-scale state registration by qualifica-
tion. The states thus need to develop mechanisms that will regulate rule
504 offerings without burdening them with excessive compliance costs.
Among such mechanisms might be exemptions that limit the number
and nature of the purchasers while requiring some type of short-form
disclosure as a condition of the exemption. The states could specifically
tailor such exemptions to rule 504 offerings. Some states already have
developed highly flexible rules of that type.3 95 A particularly important
mechanism would be a simplified registration form. Such a form would
limit the amounts and types of required disclosure, thereby making state
registration much less expensive and time-consuming. The wide availa-
bility of such a form would be particularly valuable under the revised
394. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 389-90.
395. An example of such a rule is MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 02.04.09 (1983), IA Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) 30,435. For discussion, see Sargent, supra note 73, at 541-56.
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version of rule 504, because it would improve issuers' ability to take ad-
vantage of the new $1 million ceiling on the aggregate offering price. A
cooperative drafting effort between NASAA and representatives of the
ABA recently resulted in NASAA's adoption of a Small Corporate Of-
ferings Registration Form, popularly known as SCOR.39 6 The drafters
designed this form for use with state registration of rule 504 offerings,39 7
and it offers a promising start toward resolution of rule 504 problems.
The individual states also will have to adopt SCOR, however, before the
problem can be deemed solved. Widespread adoption of SCOR and a
true uniform limited offering exemption would be crucial steps toward
resolving the persistent tensions in this area, and toward achieving a ra-
tional allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the states and the
SEC.
B. An Integration Safe Harbor
The integration doctrine has long been one of the major puzzles of
SEC exemptive policy. The doctrine originated under the statutory sec-
tion 4(2) exemption, and the SEC has expressly incorporated it into vir-
tually all of the sections 3(b) and 4(2) exemptive rules.39 8 While useful
and perhaps necessary from an investor protection standpoint, the inte-
gration doctrine historically has injected substantial uncertainty into the
planning of exempt transactions.
The key to the doctrine is that all purchases and sales that are part of
the same issue should be taken into account for purposes of determining
whether the issue as a whole meets the conditions of the applicable ex-
emption. 399 The goal of the doctrine is to prevent issuers from chopping
offerings into artificially distinct segments to avoid limitations on the
number of purchasers or the aggregate offering price.4"o The doctrine
396. Small Corporate Offerings Registration Form (Form U-7) (adopted Apr. 29, 1989),
NASAA Reports (CCH) 5057 [hereinafter SCOR]. For discussion of the development of SCOR
through ajoint NASAA-ABA project, see supra authorities cited note 322. For critical analysis, see
Sargent, The SCOR Solution, 18 SEc. REG. L.J. 93 (1990).
397. SCOR, supra note 396, at 5197.
398. For a comprehensive survey of the origins and development of this doctrine, see Wallace,
Integration of Securities Offerings: Obstacles to Capital Formation Remain for Small Businesses, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 935, 953-66 (1988).
399. Deaktor, Integration of Securities Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 465, 492 (1979); Shapiro &
Sachs, Integration Under the Securities Act: Once an Exemption, Not Always, . . ., 31 MD. L. REV. 3,
9-10 (1971); Wallace, supra note 398, at 937.
400. Deaktor, supra note 399, at 492.
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thus makes sense as a way of preventing issuers from elevating form over
substance to avoid their obligations under the securities laws.
The exquisite difficulty of determining when apparently discrete offer-
ings are actually part of a single issue, however, has created great practi-
cal problems for issuers who are not trying to manipulate the securities
laws. To preserve maximum flexibility under the integration doctrine,
the SEC has left the basic concept largely undefined, and contented itself
with a five factor test"° that is of relatively little help to transaction
planners.
This test, which was expressly incorporated into Regulation D as rule
502(a), requires consideration of whether the sales: (1) are part of a
"single plan of financing;" (2) involve the issuance of "the same class of
securities;" (3) are made "at or about the same time;" (4) are made for
the "same type of consideration;" and (5) are made for "the same general
purpose. ' 40
2
The SEC's and the courts' utterances on this test4° 3 have never clearly
established how many of these factors must be present before integration
will result or whether some factors are more important than others. It is
also not clear whether there is any real difference between the first fac-
tor-"single plan of financing"-and the fifth-"same general purpose."
In fact, those two factors are so open-ended as to constitute virtual re-
statements of the general question of whether an offering is part of the
same issue.
The five factor test is particularly useless with respect to the latest
wrinkle in integration: issuer integration.4°4 In traditional integration
analysis, the question is whether apparently discrete offerings by the
same issuer should be regarded as part of the same issue. Under an is-
401. See Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961); Securities
Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317 (1962). For critical analysis of
this formulation, see Deaktor, supra note 399, at 502, 505; Integration of Securities Offerings: Report
of the Task Force on Integration, 41 Bus. LAw. 595, 596, 600, 623 (1986) (report of task force of
ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities) [hereinafter ABA Integration Report]; Wal-
lace, supra note 398, at 939-40.
402. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1989).
403. For citations to this body of law, see Wallace, supra note 398, at 953-66.
404. For discussion of this concept, see ABA Integration Report, supra note 401, at 621-31; Inte-
gration of Partnership Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 Bus. LAW. 1591,
1610-11 (1982) (report of the ABA Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts, and Unincorporated As-
sociations) [hereinafter ABA Partnership Report]; Morrissey, Integration of Securities Offerings-The
ABA's "Indiscreet" Proposal, 26 ARiz. L. REv. 41, 64-69 (1984); Stevenson, Integration and Private
Placements, 19 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 49, 57 (1986); Wallace, supra note 398, at 967-71.
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suer integration analysis, the question is whether offerings by apparently
discrete issuers should be integrated. This question is particularly acute
in the limited partnership context, in which a single corporation may act
as general partner or otherwise sponsor a series of very similar limited
partnership offerings." 5 Under an issuer integration analysis, that cor-
poration may be regarded as the issuer of all of those limited partnership
units, despite the various limited partnerships' legal status as distinct
entities. 4°6
The five factor test is of very little use in such contexts. The securities
are inevitably of the same class, they typically are all sold for the same
type of consideration, and they usually are all sold at or about the same
time. Whether they are part of a "single plan of financing" or sold for
the "same general purpose" depends upon how one interprets those con-
cepts, and different interpretations are certainly possible. Some sort of
guidance is needed.
The SEC's reluctance to provide hard and fast rules is understandable,
because such rules can simply become a road map for successful evasion.
The SEC can meet the need for a higher level of predictability, however,
by adopting a substantive safe harbor rule. Such a rule would provide
planners with greater certainty by allowing them to identify a specific set
of circumstances under which integration definitely will not arise, while
allowing the SEC flexibility to determine when other circumstances will
give rise to integration. The adoption of a safe harbor rule, furthermore,
would not really be a novelty, because the SEC has long applied a tempo-
ral safe harbor, deeming transactions more than six months prior to the
commencement of an offering and more than six months after the com-
pletion of the offering not to be part of the same issue.4° 7
What is needed now is a more substantive safe harbor, particularly in
the issuer integration context. An ABA task force already has proposed
a model safe harbor that would address this problem very effectively.408
The ABA's proposal contains several elements, but the crux is that offer-
405. This was precisely the issue in the leading issuer integration case, SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d
633 (9th Cir. 1980). See also SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1982) (following Murphy).
406. Murphy, 626 F.2d at 644.
407. Such a temporal safe harbor is already included in rules 502(a) and 147(b)(2), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.502(a) (1989), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2) (1989).
408. ABA Integration Report, supra note 401, at 631-32. This proposal derived from a proposal
set forth in the earlier ABA Partnership Report, supra note 404, at 1610-11. For a critique, see
Morrissey, supra note 404, at 69-76. For a defense and extension, see Wallace, supra note 398, at
967-71.
[Vol. 68:225
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss2/2
THE NEW REGULATION D
ings by legally distinct issuers should not be integrated if each issuer pos-
sesses "economic independence," that is, "an independent opportunity to
meet its primary investment objectives."''4 9 Under this standard, integra-
tion will not result if the offering in question is "designed to fund a sepa-
rate and independent entity that is not financially dependent upon any
entity created through any other offering involving a common spon-
sor."410 This standard, of course, creates its own interpretive problems,
but it at least eliminates the possibility that all series of limited partner-
ship offerings with common sponsors will be regarded as single issues
under the issuer integration doctrine.
The ABA proposal was perhaps too controversial for the SEC to con-
sider seriously during the 1987-1989 revisions, but the proposal may be
an idea, like the substantial compliance idea, whose time will come.
Once the SEC perceives that it will be able to preserve substantial en-
forcement flexibility despite the safe harbor, it may be willing to consider
its adoption.
C. Reexamination of the General Solicitation Doctrine
As explained in Part 1,411 rule 502(c) bans any general solicitation in
connection with an offering under rule 505 or 506 and, in some circum-
stances, under rule 504. The history of this ban is too long and compli-
cated to bear retelling here, especially since recent scholarly commentary
already has exposed its dubious antecedents and currently confused sta-
tus. 412 Suffice it to say that this apparently innocuous prohibition began
to create serious practical problems after the adoption of Regulation D.
Rule 501(e) permitted accredited investors to be excluded for purposes of
the "body count" under rules 505 and 506.4' 3 Offerings under those
rules were thus permitted thirty-five non-accredited investors and an un-
limited number of accredited investors. As transactions involving dozens
or even scores of accredited investors began to surface, a tension between
rule 501(e) and the rule 502(c) general solicitation ban emerged. How,
after all, could an issuer assemble so many investors without a general
solicitation?
409. ABA Integration Report, supra note 401, at 631; ABA Partnership Report, supra note 404, at
1611.
410. ABA Partnership Report, supra note 404, at 1610.
411. See supra text accompanying note 35.
412. See Daugherty, supra note 108.
413. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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This tension provoked an outpouring of requests to the SEC for inter-
pretive guidance. The SEC responded with a few no-action letters.41 4
One commentator describes the resulting state of the law in the following
terms:
These few letters comprise all of the Staff's written interpretations of the
"general solicitation" prohibition of rule 502(c). In sum, almost any use of
the media to offer securities is said to be prohibited. In the Staff's view, the
rule also forbids solicitation (which is broadly construed), in connection
with any offering (whether underway or contemplated), of any individual
with whom the issuer or other seller lacks a "substantive relationship."
The letters support, however, one very important practice that had been
suspect while rule 146 was operative and had been presumed illegal before
then. They show that, in the Staff's view, a solicitation is not "general,"
and thus rule 502(c) is not violated, merely because a great number of pro-
spective investors may be approached.415
In the absence of radical change, concepts such as "substantive relation-
ship"-also called "preexisting relationship"-will provide the frame-
work for analysis of the general solicitation issue. 16 Securities
practitioners can be expected to develop the subtlety of scholastic theolo-
gians with respect to this issue, or at least the perspicuity of ancient
priests attempting to discern the future in the entrails of slaughtered
beasts.
The SEC did give some reassurance to the priesthood in Release No.
33-6825, when it stated that
inasmuch as general solicitation is not defined in Regulation D, the ques-
tion of whether or not particular activities constitute a general solicitation
must always be determined in the context of the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. Thus, for example, if an offering is structured so
that only persons with whom the issuer and its agents have had a prior
relationship are solicited, the fact that one potential investor with whom
there is no such prior relationship is called may not necessarily result in a
general solicitation.417
414. For citations to and discussion of these letters, see Daugherty, supra note 108, at 103-15;
Lipson & Scharfman, General Solicitations in Exempt Offerings, 20 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG. 8, 9-
12 (1987); Martin & Parsons, The Preexisting Relationship Doctrine Under Regulation D: A Rule
Without Reason?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1031, 1040-43 (1989).
415. Daugherty, supra note 108, at 113.
416. For critical analysis of this concept, see Martin & Parsons, supra note 414, at 1043-47 ("the
preexisting relationship criterion has little, if any, bearing on whether the protections of the Securi-
ties Act are necessary in particular circumstances").
417. Securities Act Release No. 6825, 54 Fed. Reg. at 11,370.
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Practitioners will derive reassurance from this announcement of the
SEC's willingness to consider the "particular facts and circumstances of
each case" and to forgive minor lapses from the prior or substantive rela-
tionship requirement if the issurer had in place an appropriate procedure
to avoid general solicitation.4"' The SEC's apparent reasonableness on
these questions, however, does not constitute a response to a more funda-
mental question.
To put that question most simply: What benefit do investors derive
from the ban on general solicitation? Investors in rule 506 transactions
are either accredited or sophisticated. In rule 505 transactions they are
either accredited or the beneficiaries of detailed disclosure requirements.
In rule 504 transactions they rely on state law. What, then, does the
general solicitation ban accomplish? Does it protect investors from fraud
or overreaching? Arguably their own status or the delivery of a disclo-
sure document accomplishes that. Does the ban have a prophylactic ef-
fect that somehow keeps Regulation D transactions limited in scale?
Arguably the aggregate offering price and purchaser limitations accom-
plish those goals.
So what is left for the general solicitation ban to accomplish? The SEC
either should provide some clear articulation of the beneficial effects of
the ban, or should consider removing it as a constraint on capital forma-
tion.419 This may not be possible with respect to rule 506, because sec-
tion 4(2), which exempts only nonpublic offerings, may require the ban
on general solicitation.42 Under its very broad section 3(b) rulemaking
authority, however, the SEC could eliminate the prohibition for purposes
of rule 505 or 504 offerings, much as it has for state-registered rule 504
offerings. There is thus some room for change.
It may very well be that the other exemptive requirements contained in
the Regulation D rules are not sufficient to prevent investor abuse in the
absence of a general solicitation ban. The elimination of the constraint
might produce a wide-open atmosphere that would generate too much
temptation for even well-intentioned issuers and counsel. That worst
418. See Schneider, supra note 216, at 1214 ("The SEC sends a clear message to the counsel and
the courts that, if there is a reasonable plan to preclude general solicitation and advertising, an
insignificant event which exceeds the limits of the plan should not necessarily cause a section 5
violation").
419. For earlier arguments to this effect, see Campbell, supra note 106, at 136-43; Cohn, supra
note 108, at 25-33.
420. But see Daugherty, supra note 108, at 127-28 (arguing that abolition of the doctrine with
respect to section 4(2) and rule 506 might be possible).
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case scenario, however, may not come to pass. Perhaps an experiment is
in order. The SEC could eliminate the general ban for a two- or three-
year period, while continuing to prohibit public advertising through the
print and electronic media, or confine the experiment to rule 505 offer-
ings below a specified dollar amount. Whatever the terms of the experi-
ment, some rethinking is in order.421
VII. CONCLUSION
The creation of the "new" Regulation D, on one level, was simply a
new stage in the SEC's ongoing reassessment of its basic approach to the
1933 Act exemptions for private and limited offerings. This Article's
closer look at the way in which the "new" Regulation D was created,
however, showed that this reassessment of federal regulatory philosophy
exacerbated existing structural tensions with the joint state-federal sys-
tem of securities regulation. The SEC had to resolve basic questions of
regulatory philosophy, therefore, not only-and perhaps not even pri-
marily-on their merits but also in terms of their implications for this
curious partnership. It thus was not enough for the SEC simply to de-
cide that the disproportionate burdens imposed upon small business by
the 1933 Act required experimentation with different and less restrictive
approaches to investor protection. The shape and scale of the experi-
ment was determined by a dialectical struggle in which the SEC was
tugged in one direction by an organized securities bar arguing for
broader deregulatory change and in another by state securities adminis-
trators urging greater SEC deference to their particular conception of the
needs of investors.
The changes to Regulation D that emerged from the 1987-1989 revi-
sion process bore the marks of this struggle. While the overall tilt of the
ultimate synthesis certainly was toward liberalizing Regulation D and
making it easier and less dangerous to use, the changes were perhaps
more modest than they would have been had the state administrators not
interceded.
This result arguably can be defended on the grounds that the state
administrators helped make regulatory change proceed at a more cau-
tious, manageable pace, and that they were entitled to influence policy
decisions that would effect the allocation of regulatory responsibilities
421. For suggestions of some other incremental reforms that the SEC could consider, see
Daugherty, supra note 108, at 128-34.
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between the states and the SEC. The state administrators' role in the
process, however, has not been invariably constructive. ULOE is uni-
form in name only, and many individual state administrators' insistence
on trivial and frequently meaningless variations on the basic ULOE
model has increased transactional costs. The state implementation of
ULOE thus has undone much of the good achieved by Regulation D
without generating clear and convincing evidence of real benefits to in-
vestors. SCOR represents a promising attempt to create a special state
registration vehicle for transactions exempted under rule 504 from fed-
eral registration, but the promise will become reality only if state imple-
mentation of SCOR achieves the uniformity that has eluded ULOE.
Continued improvement in the regulation of limited and private offer-
ings of securities, however, does not depend exclusively on the efforts of
the state administrators. Now that the SEC has resolved the major
problems with the Regulation D filing requirement and the substantial
compliance concept, it can turn to the even more controversial and per-
haps less tractable integration and general solicitation doctrines. This
Article has made the case, at least, for a more fundamental and convinc-
ing articulation by the SEC of the rationale for these doctrines. The
SEC's demonstrated willingness to experiment with new approaches to
balancing the needs of investor protection and capital formation, both in
the Regulation D context and elsewhere,422 gives some hope that these
troubling doctrines may soon receive a much-needed reexamination.
422. A major example of the SEC's willingness to experiment with novel approaches to balanc-
ing these different interests is its recent adoption of rule 144A. Securities Act Release No. 6839,
(July 11, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 30,076 (1989). This new rule greatly facilitates the resale of restricted
securities to certain institutional investors. It will have an indirect impact on Regulation D by mak-
ing some securities originally sold under that regulation more liquid. The impact may be modest,
however, because it will be largely limited to securities sold and traded in purely institutional mar-
kets. It should not have much of an impact on smaller corporate or limited partnership financings
under Regulation D that primarily involve individual or smaller institutional investors. Rule 144A
should have a greater impact on the purely institutional market in which § 4(2) typically exempts
primary offerings. For discussion of the use of § 4(2) in that market, see ABA Institutional Private
Placements Report, supra note 18.
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